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Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty:
Rethinking the Intersection of Private
Litigation and Public Goals
Martin H. Redisht
Though on its face the class action appears to be nothing
more than an elaborate procedural joinder device, in recent years
it has become the focal point of much political and legal debate.
Courts have noted "the intense pressure to settle"' caused by the
very filing of a class action, while others believe the procedure
amounts to "judicial blackmail."' Those who take a more positive
view of the class action consider it to be an effective means of po-
licing corporate behavior and an assurance that injured victims
will be compensated in the most efficient manner.'
Adopted as Rule 23 in the original Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in 1937, the federal class action device was dramatically
revised in 1966, when it largely assumed its current format.4
Since the early 1990s, the Rules Advisory Committee has consid-
ered, but for the most part declined to implement, a number of
' Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law. The author would like to thank Christopher Leslie, John McGinnis,
and Mark Rosen for valuable comments on earlier drafts. He would also like to thank Kate
Bennett and James Metzger of the class of 2004 at Northwestern University School of Law
and Alexandra Rosenbaum of the class of 2004 at Northwestern University for their valu-
able research assistance.
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rohrer Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir 1995).
2 Richard L. Marcus, et al, Civil Procedure: A Modern Approach 309 (West 3d ed
2000).
' See, for example, Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 1-
14, 163-71 (Northwestern 1995) (emphasizing the need for the tort system to compensate
harmed plaintiffs and to provide an indirect deterrent effect as well); David Rosenberg,
Class Actions for Mass Tort: Doing Individual Justice By Collective Means, 62 Ind L J 561,
567 (1987) (arguing that "bureaucratic justice implemented through class actions provides
better opportunities for achieving individual justice than does the tort system's private
law, disaggregative processes").
' See FRCP 23. The rule remained unchanged until 1987 when subdivision (c) was
amended to eliminate all gender-specific language. In 1998, Rule 23(f) was added to permit
courts of appeal to exercise discretion to hear interlocutory appeal of orders granting or
denying class certification. In April 2003, Rule 23 was amended in several ways. See
Moore's Federal Rules Pamphlet 2001 214 (Lexis 2000). See also note 5. None of those
amendments, however, in any way moots the propositions in this article.
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significant structural changes in Rule 23's format.5 The Commit-
tee continues to struggle with the possibility of more far-reaching
amendment of the Rule.6 Scholars have also devoted substantial
attention to the class action issue, particularly its increasing use
in the mass tort context.7
"[11n 1991 ... the Judicial Conference asked the [Advisory] Committee to begin a
reconsideration of the Rule in light of the upheaval in modem civil litigation since adop-
tion of the Rule." David F. Levi, Memorandum to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee:
Perspectives on Rule 23 Including the Problem of Overlapping Classes 4 (Apr 24, 2002),
available online at <http://www.lfcj.com/articles/display.asp?artnum=70> (visited Aug 25,
2003). Judge Levi further notes that "[alt the beginning, the Committee developed a com-
prehensive re-draft of the Rule. In 1992, Judge Pointer, Chair of the Committee ... pre-
pared a revision that ... provided for opt-in classes at the court's discretion... ' Id. The
Committee recommended, and ultimately the Supreme Court promulgated, the new Rule
23(fR effective December 1, 1998, which authorized a court of appeals, in its discretion, to
permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certifi-
cation. See FRCP 23(0; FRCP 23(f) Advisory Committee's Note, 1998 Amendments. For an
approving commentary on the addition of Rule 23(f), see Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in
Wholeville: Rule 23(f a Good Rulemaking, 69 Tenn L Rev 97 (2001). Far-reaching addi-
tional reforms were proposed, but ultimately not promulgated, in 1996. For a general
discussion of the 1996 proposed reforms of Rule 23, see George L. Priest, Procedural Ver-
sus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J Legal Stud 521, 537-39 (1997).
Reforms to Rule 23 were also proposed in 2001. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, Civil and Criminal Procedure and the
Rules of Evidence, 201 FRD 560, 586-657 (2001).
Advisory Committee officials recently indicated that "[tihere are several areas that
may yet deserve additional attention and that have not received definitive answers...."
Levi, Memorandum to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee at 7 (cited in note 5). In particu-
lar, the Committee "may ... reconsider the opt-in/opt-out question. The 1966 Committee
adopted an 'opt-out' provision but did not foresee the consequences of doing so." Id at 7-8.
In 1992, a Committee draft recommended providing the trial court with discretion to cer-
tify the class as an opt-in or opt-out class, but the recommendation was "then withdrawn
on the Standing Committee's advice that further consideration would be required before
such a sweeping proposal could be published for public comment." Id. That recommenda-
tion "might provide a starting point" for the current Committee's reconsideration of the
issue. Id. In his memorandum, Judge Levi writes: "In the years since that time, we have
engaged in [the further consideration called for by the Standing Committee], and can now
appreciate how prescient and sophisticated that first effort was." Levi, Memorandum to
Civil Rules Advisory Committee at 5 (cited in note 5). For a detailed examination of the
opt-out issue and a recommendation for an amendment replacing opt-out with opt-in, see
text accompanying notes 82-106. For a recommendation for dramatic revision in the cur-
rent opt-out procedure, see Part IV B.
' See, for example, sources cited in note 3. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343 (1995) (examining the
development of the mass tort class action and proposing remedies to protect the interests
of future claimants); Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibil-
ity: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 Va L Rev 845 (1987) (arguing that mass tort
actions pose a responsibility dilemma and suggesting non-tort solutions). These citations,
it should be noted, are only a few of a considerably longer list.
CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Much of the scholarly commentary has been highly critical of
the modern class action.8 Despite this widespread judicial and
scholarly attention, neither courts nor scholars appear to have
recognized a fundamental problem with the modern class action:
in all too many cases, the modern class action has undermined
the foundational precepts of American democracy. It has done so
by effectively transforming the essence of the governing substan-
tive law that the class action has been created to enforce. This
transformation has come about even though the class action de-
vice is not structured for the purpose of altering the underlying
law. Thus, controlling substantive law is not transformed through
the democratic process of legislative amendment, where the elec-
torate may measure its chosen representatives by how they voted
on the proposed revisions of existing law. Rather, this dramatic
alteration in governing substantive law arises from, essentially, a
form of indirection and subterfuge, by use of a procedural device
whose sole legitimate function is the considerably more modest
8 Pre-existing scholarly critiques of the class action differ substantially from my own.
Professor Coffee has pointed to "three distinct themes" of academic criticism that have
been leveled at class actions: first, "that the legal rules governing the private attorney
general have created misincentives that unnecessarily frustrate the utility of private
enforcement;" second, "that the incentive to litigate may be inherently excessive, in large
part because the parties to an action do not bear its public costs," leading to a "failure to
internalize the full cost of litigation, including the costs of the judicial systems," resulting
in an artificial inflation in the demand for litigation as a "public subsidy equal to these
costs, and the private incentive to litigate exceeds the social incentive," causing "an exces-
sive reliance on law and lawyers;" and finally, that "the social benefits of litigation
brought by private attorneys general" should be discounted because "rational, well-
informed plaintiffs might bring an action that has no chance of success at trial in order to
extort a recovery from the defendants." John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum L Rev 669, 671-72 (1986). See also Coffee, 95
Colum L Rev at 1345-49 (cited in note 7).
In contrast to these economic critiques, my analysis focuses exclusively on criti-
cisms derived from the perspective of American political theory. Nor is my critique based
on concerns about agency problems growing out of plaintiffs' attorneys' alleged failure to
satisfy their attorney-client obligations to the class members. Finally, I am not arguing, as
Judge Friendly did many years ago, that "the benefits to the individual class members are
usually minimal" while lawyer compensation "seems inordinate." Henry Friendly, Federal
Jurisdiction: A General View 119-20 (Columbia 1976). See also Edward J. Ross, Rule
23(b) Class Actions-A Matter of "Practice and Procedure" Or "Substantive Right"? 27
Emory L J 247, 249 (1978) (commenting that "recovery from the settlement of a class
action does not necessarily inure to the allegedly damaged class members; the real reward
is often to their lawyers"). My concern, rather, is with the all-too-frequent situation in
which, for all practical purposes, the class is simply irrelevant to the suit because class
members effectively receive no meaningful relief.
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one of implementing and facilitating the enforcement of existing
substantive law.9
In considering the modern class action's problematic impact
on American democracy, it is important to keep in mind a central
fact often ignored in modern procedural scholarship: the class
action was never designed to serve as a free-standing legal device
for the purpose of "doing justice," nor is it a mechanism intended
to serve as a roving policeman of corporate misdeeds or as a
mechanism by which to redistribute wealth. ° Both its structure
and description, rather, make clear that it is nothing more than
an elaborate procedural device designed to facilitate the enforce-
ment of pre-existing substantive law. A class action suit, after all,
does not "arise under" Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. If no pre-existing substantive law vests a cause of action
in plaintiff class members, they cannot bring a class action suit.
' In the American political system, certain counter-majoritarian constitutional prin-
ciples also limit policymaking by representative and accountable governmental bodies. For
present purposes, however, I proceed on the assumption that the legislative action does
not violate any constitutional constraint.
It is also true, of course, that in our post-New Deal society, many policy choices are
made by administrative agencies, which are neither representative nor accountable-at
least directly. As a theoretical matter, this fact arguably gives rise to serious constitu-
tional problems for the operation of such agencies. See Martin H. Redish, The Constitution
As Political Structure 135-65 (Oxford 1995). However, as a practical matter, a certain
level of administrative discretion is required in implementing general statutes, because
enforcement requires that the statutes be applied to specific circumstances. Moreover,
such agency action may usually be attributed to the executive, who is both representative
of and accountable to the electorate. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Adminis-
trators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J L, Econ, & Org 81, 95-99 (1985). In any
event, as noted in more detail in Part III, the class action device neither interprets nor
amends specific substantive laws, while administrative agencies at least purport to be
interpreting and enforcing specific legislative directives. Thus, modification of the under-
lying substantive law by use of the neutral class action device is completely indefensible
as a matter of democratic theory. See Part IV.
It should be noted that in 1995, Congress did deal with class action representation
issues (in the narrow context of securities litigation) when it enacted the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act Pub L No 104-67 101, 109 Stat 737 (1995), codified at 15 USC
§ 78u-4 (2000). However, enactment of this legislation in no way moots the democratic
concern to which this Article points. Initially, the Act focuses exclusively on aspects of
securities class actions, and thus has no relevance to any other area in which class actions
are brought. Secondly, by imposing a variety of criteria that named plaintiffs in securities
class actions must satisfy, Congress actually evinced its desire to preserve the private
rights nature of this category of class actions. Thus, it is only by means of the misleading
argument that congressional action in the securities area necessarily implies congres-
sional satisfaction with all other areas that one can conclude that Congress has "spoken."
Even if this assertion were true as a matter of congressional understanding (a highly
unlikely scenario in any event), it completely ignores the constitutional requirements of
bicameralism and presentment for the enactment of legislation.
" I refer to such a mode of thinking as "the fallacy of the free-standing class action."
See Part III F 1.
CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Moreover, because, like virtually all of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 23's class action device is inherently "transsub-
stantive,"" its use should not vary based upon differences in the
nature of the substantive claim. Thus, unlike administrative in-
terpretation and application of a particular statute, invocation of
the class action device in no way authorizes creative interpreta-
tion or application of the particular substantive law in a case.
The substantive laws enforced by use of the class action de-
vice-for example, the federal antitrust laws, 2 federal consumer
protection laws,13 federal securities laws," or, in cases falling within
the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction, 5 state tort laws-all con-
tain two fundamental elements: the proscription or regulation of
an actor's "primary behavior" 6 and the provision of a remedy or
remedies by which these behavioral regulations are to be en-
forced. For the most part, these laws enforce their behavioral pro-
scriptions by establishing claims for damages for private victims
of the proscribed behavior. 7 These provisions are designed to
make the private victim whole by obtaining compensation from
those who have caused them harm. Moreover, as the statutory
provision for treble damages in the antitrust laws illustrates,'"
such damage remedies may also include punitive, as well as com-
pensatory awards. In each of these cases, the assertion of private
rights to compensation through the mechanism of litigation may
well have the incidental effect of advancing the public interest by
" "The transsubstantive philosophy dictates that procedural rules are to be inter-
preted and applied in the same manner, regardless of the substantive nature of the claim
at issue." Edward J. Brunet, et al, Summary Judgment: Federal Law and Practice 222
(West 2d ed 2000). See also Robert Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 Yale L J 718, 718 (1975) (referring to procedural rules "general-
ized across substantive lines" and noting the "trans-substantive achievement of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure"); Paul Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules
Enabling Act, 1989 Duke L J 281, 303 (noting that general sets of rules unrelated to sub-
stance put courts in the desirable position of "avoiding 'interest group' politics").
15 USC §§ 1, 2, 15 (2000).
See, for example, Truth in Lending Act, 15 USC §§ 1601-93 (2000) and Cable Tele-
vision Consumer Protection and Competition Act, 47 USC § 521 (2000).
15 USC § 78j (2000).
28 USC § 1332 (2000).
16 See Henry Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum L Rev
489, 489 (1954); Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan concurring) (com-
menting that federal and state tort systems control the "primary activity of citizens").
" In certain substantive laws the legislature chooses to enforce proscriptions on pri-
mary behavior by resort to a synthesis of a variety of remedial models, including, among
others, criminal enforcement, civil penalties, or administrative enforcement, in addition to
private compensation. See Part IV F.
18 15 USC § 15 (2000).
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punishing, deterring, and halting law violations on the part of
defendants. In this sense, the private plaintiffs may be viewed as
a type of "private attorney general."19 This is so, even if we pre-
sume that the motivation of the litigants who bring suit to en-
force their compensatory rights under the relevant substantive
law is solely the desire to improve their own personal economic
position. But under that law no plaintiff is ever required to en-
force his private compensatory right. To the contrary, the sub-
stantive law vests that choice exclusively in the individual victim.
Thus, in such situations, any incidental benefit to the public in-
terest is wholly contingent upon the private victim's decision to
seek to judicially enforce her substantively created remedy.
Where the government wishes to deter or punish unlawful
behavior in a more direct and reliable manner, it has several op-
tions available to it. Instead of, or in addition to, the private com-
pensatory remedy, a legislature may utilize any permutation or
combination of a variety of conceivable remedial models, includ-
ing criminal enforcement, civil penalties, and administrative
regulation. For purposes of democratic theory, there are several
key points to note about the substantive law's choice of remedial
model. To be sure, a legislative choice of behavioral proscription
may be of enormous political import. Normative issues of social
policy often turn on the legislative selection of specific acts to be
prohibited or restricted. But also of potentially great social and
political significance is the legislative choice of how to implement
and enforce those directives-for example, whether a judicially
enforceable compensatory remedy will be created, whether relief
will be confined to the imposition of criminal penalties, or
whether civil fines will also be authorized. Unless a particular
substantive law authorizes enforcement through private victim
compensation, the entire structure of private rights compensatory
adjudication is generally rendered irrelevant. ° On the other
See Part II.
20 Under limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has been willing to infer a private
damage remedy when Congress has not expressly provided for one. See J.I. Case Co v
Borak, 377 US 426, 431-34 (1964) (inferring an "implied" damage remedy from the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78n(a), based upon Congressional purpose). More
recently, however, the Court has severely restricted this practice. See, for example,
Thompson v Thompson, 484 US 174 (1988) (holding that the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act of 1980 was intended for use in adjudicating custody disputes and not to create an
entirely new cause of action). For a criticism of the practice of implied remedies, see Mar-
tin H. Redish, The Federal Courts in the Political Order 39 (Carolina Academic 1991)
("The facts that the damage remedy may be thought to foster the beneficial purposes
served by the statute or that the legislature may not have foreseen the severity of the
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hand, where a statute provides for enforcement exclusively
through victim compensation, enforcement of the statute's behav-
ioral norms by any other method inevitably and profoundly alters
the statute's substantive directives.
Careful examination of both the structure of and practice un-
der Rule 23 demonstrates that all too often the device permits the
transformation of the remedial enforcement model expressly
adopted in the underlying substantive law from a victim's dam-
age award structure into an entirely distinct form not contem-
plated in the underlying substantive law.21 In such cases, the
suits are not, in any realistic sense, brought either by or on behalf
of the class members. The class members neither make the deci-
sion to sue at the outset nor receive meaningful compensation at
the end. Instead, in these suits, as a practical matter, it is the
private attorneys who initiate suit and who are the only ones re-
warded for exposing the defendants' law violations. In effect, the
promise of substantial attorneys' fees provides the class lawyers
with a private economic incentive to discover violations of exist-
ing legal restrictions on corporate behavior. Thus, what purports
to be a class action, brought primarily to enforce private indi-
viduals' substantive rights to compensatory relief, in reality
amounts to little more than private attorneys acting as bounty
hunters, protecting the public interest by enforcing the public
policies embodied in controlling statutes.
In these "faux" class actions, most members of the class never
make a conscious choice to seek judicial enforcement of their sub-
stantive right to pursue private damages.22 Indeed, because mem-
bership in a Rule 23(b)(3) class is established merely by the class
problem matter little because the damage remedy was not subjected to the formal re-
quirements of the legislative process ... :) (internal citations omitted). But see Richard
Stewart and Cass Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv L Rev 1193,
1229 (1982) (rejecting criticism of implied remedies as unduly formalistic).
" Not all modern 23(b)(3) class actions are properly described as "faux" class actions
in the sense described here. In a number of cases, attorneys may obtain meaningful relief
on behalf of the class members. See Deborah R. Hensler, et al, Class Action Dilemmas:
Pursuing Public Goals For Private Gain 427-39 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 2000)
(noting that average payments in the mass tort cases studied ranged from $1,400 to
$100,000 and that some actions resulted in meaningful nonmonetary relief such as
changes in laws or removal of harmful products from the market). But see Part III A
(questioning validity of opt-out procedure).
" Note that substantive statutes providing for private damage remedies generally do
not distinguish between individual and group rights. Invariably, such statutes create only
a damage remedy vested in the individual. Thus, any class action brought to enforce those
rights must properly be viewed as nothing more than a procedural conglomeration of
individually granted rights. See text accompanying note 151.
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member's failure to opt out of the class (rather than her decision
to affirmatively opt in), 3 many members of the class quite proba-
bly never focus upon, recognize, or understand the notification of
the class suit. At the very least, it is impossible to be certain of
the contrary assumption. Thus, it is quite conceivable that many
class members are even unaware that they are parties to a law-
suit. Moreover, when the litigation dust settles, even in cases in
which the plaintiff class prevails (either by means of judgment or
settlement), often the overwhelming majority of class members
never receive anything approaching meaningful compensation for
the defendants' violation of their substantive rights. Instead, they
are frequently "awarded" the opportunity to receive some form of
discount coupon for purchase of a product or service already pro-
vided by the defendant in the normal course of business. 4 This
relief is provided even though the discount is often for products or
services likely to be of little or no use to the overwhelming major-
ity of class members.25 Despite such virtually non-existent benefit
to the class and non-existent loss to the defendant, courts have
regularly approved such class settlements.26 Of course, one might
ask, if the absent class members have so little interest in the out-
come of the class action, why should the fact that they receive no
meaningful compensation really matter? The answer is not that
we should be concerned about the individual class members as
much as we should be concerned about the fundamental trans-
formation of the underlying substantive law through the purely
procedural device of the class action. As a result of the class ac-
tion procedure, what purports to be a substantive compensatory
framework has been furtively transformed into a structure in
which no one receives compensation through enforcement of the
underlying substantive law. We never know whether the public
would approve such a transformation, because it is never in-
formed that such a transformation has been made. It is, then, the
impact on the democratic process, rather than the impact on in-
dividual class members, that gives rise to concern.
See FRCP 23(c)(2); Part II A.
See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L Rev 991, 994 (2002) (noting
the "increasing popularity of coupon settlements").
2" See id at 995 (noting that in coupon-based settlements, "many class members are
left uncompensated"). See also Part II B.
" See id at 1052-54 (noting that many courts approve coupon-based settlements even
though they possess the power to reject them as unfair).
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Even where meaningful compensation is obtained on behalf
of the class as a whole, in many of these cases individual class
members cannot receive compensation without a class member's
affirmative filing of a complex claim form. This is so despite the
fact that, under the opt-out procedure established in Rule 23, the
class member becomes a class member by the failure to take any
affirmative act. One cannot readily assume that a class member
who entered the class passively is likely to exercise his right to
relief by now affirmatively filing a claim.27 The only individuals
receiving significant financial awards in these faux class actions
are the class's lawyers. When these class actions settle, the
amount of the attorneys' award is determined by reference to the
abstract financial "value" of the discounted coupons that the class
members are offered as part of the settlement.28
For all practical purposes the classes in these suits are remi-
niscent of the life-sized celebrity cardboard cutouts that occasion-
ally appear on large city street corners, accompanied by a photog-
rapher anxious to snap a tourist's picture standing alongside.
Much like the cutout's appearance in the photograph, at first
glance the class appears to exist, but closer scrutiny reveals that
it is little more than a two-dimensional, cardboard version of a
real class of plaintiffs.
It does not automatically follow that such actions are inher-
ently invidious, immoral, or illegal. Nor does it automatically fol-
low that such actions will necessarily fail to foster the public in-
terest by enforcing the substantive law's proscriptions on defen-
dant's primary behavior.29 To the contrary, it is not unreasonable
to predict that the public interest in assuring corporations' com-
pliance with legislatively-imposed restrictions on their primary
behavior might be significantly advanced by the creation of eco-
nomic inducements to private individuals to ferret out and seek
judicial relief for violations of those proscriptions. The point,
rather, is that these faux class actions seek to advance and pro-
tect the substantive law's behavioral norms by resort to a "bounty
See text accompanying note 114.
See text accompanying note 117.
Purely as an empirical matter, however, this question appears to be an open one.
Evidence exists to support the proposition that many private class action lawyers do not
actually ferret out previously unknown corporate law violations, but merely "tag along"
after successful government criminal or civil proceedings. See text accompanying notes
66-71.
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hunter" remedial model that is very different from the one estab-
lished in the substantive law being enforced in the class action. °
The concept of the bounty hunter holds a venerable position
in our nation's history. In the Old West of the second half of the
nineteenth century, law enforcement agencies were generally un-
derstaffed, especially relative to the high level of criminal activ-
ity. One means of augmenting public authorities' resources was
resort to partial reliance on private bounty hunters. 1 Rewards
were offered for the apprehension--often, dead or alive-of
wanted criminals. Motivated as much or more by considerations
of personal greed than civic responsibility, bounty hunters made
a career out of apprehending these criminals, thereby qualifying
for the rewards." In this manner, the bounty hunters effectively
furthered the public interest by seeking to promote their own
personal economic interests.
In the faux class actions, the class attorneys function in a
manner strikingly parallel to the Old West's bounty hunters: as a
reward for their efforts in ferreting out illegal corporate behavior,
these private advocates receive substantial attorneys' fees, either
negotiated as part of a settlement or awarded by a court after
judgment. Thus, as was the case with the Old West's bounty
hunters, the pursuit of private gain motivates private individuals
to expose illegal activity, thereby supposedly furthering the
broader public interest in having the corporate world adhere to
the broad behavioral proscriptions set by governmental authori-
ties.33 But the bounty hunters of the Old West furthered the pub-
lic interest not by redistributing illegally held wealth to the
' It appears that Professor Coffee was the first commentator to employ the term
"bounty hunter" in describing class action plaintiffs' lawyers. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Res-
cuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working, 42 Md L Rev 215, 218 (1983). However, as subsequent discussion will make
clear, Professor Coffee's use of the term was overbroad. See text accompanying notes 74-
75.
"' The use of bounty hunters as an auxiliary to law enforcement continues to this very
day through the use of the private bail bondsman system. See, for example, State v Cov-
ington, 2002 WL 1592704, I1 (Tenn Crim App); People v Brewton, 2002 WL 1486572 (Cal
App).
3 In the mid-twentieth century, actor Steve McQueen broke onto the national scene
as a bounty hunter in the Old West in a half-hour black-and-white prime time network
television series entitled "Wanted, Dead Or Alive."
"' It should be noted that I do not purport to make psychological judgments about
plaintiffs' lawyers' personal motivations. The desires to pursue personal gain and serve
the public interest are not mutually exclusive, and it is at least conceivable that certain
plaintiffs' lawyers are motivated simultaneously by both considerations. My point is, sim-
ply, that even a bounty hunter motivated by nothing more than personal gain may well
advance the public interest in her pursuit of personal gain.
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poor-one should not anachronistically confuse the bounty hunt-
ers of the Old West with Robin Hood, but rather by apprehending
those who threatened the public peace. Even when a class's at-
torneys bring an action that lacks any real plaintiffs, the suit
may nevertheless further the public interest, if in so doing it ex-
poses, punishes, and deters illegal corporate behavior. The prob-
lem, however, is that these suits are not structured to be bounty
hunter suits, but rather private compensatory damage suits,
which they often are not. The two forms of enforcement are by no
means identical from legal, social or political perspectives.34
The closest legal analogy to the bounty hunters of the Old
West has traditionally been the venerable qui tam action,35 in
which private individuals, not claiming to have suffered personal
injury as a result of specified illegal behavior against the gov-
ernment, may nevertheless bring suit to remedy that behavior.
Though the bulk of the damage award obtained as a result of a
successful qui tam action goes to the government in order to com-
pensate it for loss suffered as a result of the defendant's illegal
activity, the private litigant is rewarded with a specified percent-
age of the total damage award. In this manner, government cre-
ates private incentives in unharmed individuals to discover and
expose behavior that illegally harms the government.3 ' The prob-
lem with reliance on qui tam actions, however, is that they have
been explicitly authorized by congressional statute; class action
bounty actions have not.
In its current form, the faux class action constitutes a wholly
improper and unacceptable departure from the fundamental pre-
cepts of American democracy, and thus gives rise to what can be
described as "the democratic difficulty." The sources of the serious
(and ultimately fatal) problems of democratic theory to which the
faux class action gives rise are two-fold: (1) Such actions are not
what they purport to be-namely, compensatory damage suits-
and (2) in any event these disguised bounty hunter actions have
never been authorized by the underlying substantive law that
such actions purport to enforce. In effect, then, these actions con-
stitute a form of procedural shell game, in which a procedural
device that has been designed to do nothing more than facilitate
the enforcement of the substantive law's authorization of private
See Part II.
' See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v Stevens, 529 US 765, 774 (2000) (point-
ing to "the long tradition of qui tam actions in England and the American colonies").
See text accompanying note 75.
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damage suits 7 transforms that private remedial model into a
qualitatively different form of remedy that was never part of that
substantive law.38 If the substantive law is to authorize a bounty
hunter remedial model as a supplement to or replacement for the
pre-existing private damage remedy, the change may not prop-
erly be effected through the operation of a procedural device such
as Rule 23. Such a dramatic modification of the substantive law
through resort to an avowedly procedural device contravenes the
fundamental democratic notions of representation and account-
ability, because the process effectively deceives the electorate. As
a result of this deception, the electorate is unable to judge its
elected representatives by examining how they voted on these
important modifications of enforcement models, because those
representatives have never been asked to vote on the issue. The
democratic process is substantially undermined as a result.
In light of the insights of this democratic critique of the mod-
ern class action, one might be tempted to conclude that, as pres-
ently structured, Rule 23 violates the separation of powers pro-
tections of the United States Constitution, or at the very least the
statutory directive of the Rules Enabling Act that a procedural
rule may not abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right.39
Ultimately, these attacks are likely to fail.0 It does not follow,
however, that there exists no recourse. The implications of the
democratic critique of Rule 23 make clear that the present situa-
tion is intolerable as a matter of the normative precepts of
American democracy. It is therefore both necessary and appro-
priate for the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court to re-
consider and substantially modify Rule 23 in order to remedy this
troubling situation."
I should emphasize that my argument does not represent an
attack on class actions in the abstract. Nor am I suggesting that,
as an empirical matter, every class action currently filed should
necessarily be viewed as an invocation of a pure bounty hunter
remedial model, rather than merely as the procedural collectivi-
zation of private compensatory rights.42 The problem is that, as
'" See Rules Enabling Act, 28 USC § 2072 (2000) (prescribing that Federal Rules may
not abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right). See also Part III A.
See Part II.
28 USC § 2072(b).
o See Part III E.See Part IV.
42 But see Part II A (discussing the inherently problematic nature of the opt-out pro-
cedure).
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currently structured, Rule 23, at the very least permits and con-
dones what are pure bounty hunter actions in everything but
name. The question then becomes how to modify the adjudicatory
structure established by the Rule in order to permit the pure
class action without authorizing the faux class action.4 3 This Arti-
cle will argue that substantial amendment to Rule 23 is neces-
sary in order to assure that the class action device does nothing
more than achieve its stated purpose of facilitating the adjudica-
tion of claims authorized by pre-existing substantive law. Toward
that end, the Article will seek to fashion specific proposals for
revision of the rule that would replace the existing opt-out proce-
dure with an opt-in structure and that would substantially re-
strict the certification of class actions where there exists doubt
that truly compensatory relief could ever be fashioned."
Proponents of the modern class action would no doubt re-
spond that such amendments to Rule 23 would inevitably gut the
effectiveness of class actions as a means of policing corporate
misdeeds. It is true that many of the class actions currently in
existence would be rendered invalid under the amended Rule 23
proposed in this Article. However, the affected actions do not fit
within the private rights adjudicatory model in which Rule 23 is
supposed to function.45 In some cases, private rights adjudication
would no longer function as an effective means of furthering the
public interest by policing illegal corporate behavior, because the
individual claims are so small that maintenance of a true class
action and the distribution of compensatory relief are rendered
infeasible. In such an event, however, it is the legislature's re-
sponsibility to consider alternative options by which private ac-
tivity may be tapped as a means of protecting the public interest.
Certainly, express legislative adoption of a bounty hunter model
or other qui tam-like actions might provide such an alternative,
though consideration of the constitutionality of such alternatives
exceeds the scope of my inquiry. In a democratic society it is the
legislature's responsibility to take such action overtly, rather
than covertly-through use of the disguise of a procedural rule
4 See Conclusion.
See id.
In class actions in which individual claims are sufficiently large both to concern the
individual class member and to justify even the minimal effort required to affirmatively
become a class member, it is quite conceivable that the class action procedure would re-
main viable. Thus, as a practical matter, adoption of my proposed amendments would at
most cause a substantial reduction in class actions in which individual claims are rela-
tively minimal. See Part IV.
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that purports to do nothing more than implement the existing
substantive law's private compensatory rights structure. It is
only then that the electorate may meaningfully perform its essen-
tial function of making informed choices about those who seek to
represent it.
In exploring the interaction between modern class actions
and democratic theory, Part I of this Article initially considers
the more general question of how the pursuit of private goals and
the advancement of the public interest intersect. Part I also ex-
amines this intersection in the specific context of class actions, by
exploring how the modern class action is thought to further the
public interest as a type of private attorney general action.46 Part
II details the manner in which the current version of Rule 23 ef-
fectively transforms the essential nature of the underlying sub-
stantive law that the class action procedure is designed to im-
plement." Part III explores the problematic impact of this trans-
formation on fundamental principles of democratic theory.4" The
final section describes a series of amendments to Rule 23 that,
this Article suggests, would go a long way toward remedying the
problematic intersection of the modern class action and American
democracy."
I. DEMOCRATIC THEORY, PRIVATE LITIGATION, AND PUBLIC GOALS
There are two ways in which the modern class action impacts
foundational precepts of democratic theory. One way, raised tra-
ditionally in the debates between advocates of communitarianism
or civic republicanism on the one hand and pluralism or indi-
50vidualism on the other, concerns the manner in which the pur-
suit of narrow self-interest impacts the advancement of the
broader public interest in a democratic society. In the litigation
context, this issue presents itself primarily in the shaping of the
so-called "private attorney general" concept. The other way in
4, See Part I.
See Part II.
See Part III.
See Part IV. I should note at the outset that I do not plan in this Article to reinvent
the wheel by providing a normative basis to support the nation's historically established
commitment to the basic framework of a democratic system. Perhaps, at the most abstract
level, one could fashion persuasive normative arguments to prefer a benevolent dictator-
ship, a monarchy, or anarchy in lieu of constitutional democracy. But those arguments are
for another day. In this Article, I assume the positive and normative value of at least some
basic level of societal self-determination through resort to the representative process.
" Consider Jane J. Mansbridge, ed, Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago 1990).
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which democratic theory and class actions intersect concerns the
manner in which the modern class action subverts the fundamen-
tal democratic precepts of representation and accountability by
bringing about a disguised transformation of the underlying sub-
stantive law. In order to fully understand the nature of the lat-
ter's impact, however, one must initially grasp the essence of the
first intersection. For it is only when one comprehends the subtle
but significant distinctions, for purposes of democratic theory, in
the applications of the private attorney general theory that one
can fully understand how the modern class action improperly
transforms the essential structure of pre-existing substantive
law.
Much of the modern scholarly debate about the scope of de-
mocratic theory has focused upon the extent to which the concept
of the public interest represents something apart from the mere
summing of the citizens' individual private interests. At the ex-
tremes of this theoretical debate are the modern version of the
theory of civic republicanism, which advocates "the subordination
of private interests to the public good,"5' and the theory of "pos-
sessive individualism," in which "society is presumed to consist of
relations among independent owners, and the primary task of
government is to protect owners against illegitimate incursions
upon their property and to maintain conditions of orderly ex-
change." 2 While these two theoretical extremes are surely over-
simplifications of what is a considerably more complex issue,"
they underscore the fundamental tension between the primacy of
the individual's interest in advancing her narrowly focused pri-
vate interests and the need to have citizens "escape private inter-
ests and engage in pursuit of the public good."
" Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539, 1540 (1988). See
also Richard Fallon, What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 Harv L Rev
1695, 1698 (1989) (noting that modern civic republicanism reflects the classical version of
the theory in positing "that there exists an objective public good apart from individual
goods.. .') (internal citation omitted).
" Joseph H. Carens, Possessive Individualism and Democratic Theory: Macpherson's
Legacy, in Joseph H. Carens, ed, Democracy and Possessive Individualism: The Intellec-
tual Legacy of C.B. Macpherson 2 (SUNY 1993).
"3 For a more detailed discussion of these questions, see Martin H. Redish, The Adver-
sary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional Role of Self-Interest: The Tobacco
Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DePaul L Rev 359 (2001) (examining the role of adversary theory as
an essential part of modem liberal democratic theory and the way in which it interacts
with the civic-republicanism (progressive individualism debate).
Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan L Rev 29, 31
(1985).
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For present purposes, one need not attempt to resolve this
long-standing debate. The key point to note, rather, is that at
some level, most in our society have placed value simultaneously
on both individual autonomy and civic-mindedness. Indeed, in a
number of ways, society has sought to harness the drive for per-
sonal advancement in order to advance the public interest. By
providing personal incentives to those who are in a position to
better the community as a whole, our system has been able to
advance the public interest. For example, drug companies develop
new medicines, presumably not for altruistic purposes, but rather
out of the traditional capitalist-based motivation of profit maxi-
mization. Yet the development of those drugs substantially ad-
vances the community's interests.
In a number of ways, our legal system has even asserted a
preference for the pursuit of private gain, rather than communi-
tarianism or altruism. For example, Article III's so-called "injury-
in-fact" requirement is clearly premised on the notion that indi-
vidual litigants may resort to the federal judicial system only
when seeking to advance their personal interests.55 Would-be
plaintiffs who are motivated exclusively by altruistic or ideologi-
cal concerns may not, as a constitutional matter, invoke the fed-
eral judicial process." Unless the plaintiff has suffered some form
of personal injury traceable to the defendant's violation of law
and remediable by judicial action, she constitutionally lacks the
standing necessary to invoke the federal courts' jurisdiction.57 It
surely does not follow, however, that federal adjudication is inca-
pable of advancing social, economic, or political interests that ex-
tend well beyond the personal interest of the individual litigant.
It means, simply, that whatever impact federal adjudication may
have on the public interest must come as an incident to the asser-
tion and adjudication of narrower, personal interests.
On occasion, the legislature may create a private statutory
right to damages, at least in part for the purpose of advancing the
public interest. Private litigation may often do the government's
work for it, by deterring and punishing violations of law. By seek-
ing to benefit the individual litigants, then, adjudication may
have the incidental impact of advancing the public interest. As
Professor Coffee has written, "[p]robably to a unique degree,
6' See, for example, Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972).
See, for example, id (noting that an ideological plaintiff lacks the injury in fact
required for standing).
17 See id.
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American law relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive
provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the
discretion of public enforcement agencies."'5 Coffee further notes
that "[tihis system of enforcement .. . is most closely associated
with the federal antitrust and securities laws and the common
law's derivative action, but similar institutional arrangements
have developed recently in the environmental, 'mass tort,' and
employment discrimination fields." 9 This, in short, describes the
concept of the "private attorney general." °
If a suit brought to vindicate a single individual's private
right can be thought to foster the public interest by deterring and
punishing violations of law, it would seem to follow logically that
a class action brought on behalf of numerous victims could geo-
metrically increase the litigation's beneficial impact on the public
interest. Thus, it is not surprising that respected commentators
have recognized that "[p]rivate class actions for money damages
can yield significant social benefits."' According to Professor
Yeazell, the modern view of the private class action as a type of
private attorney general finds its origins in the 1941 scholarship
of Professors Kalven and Rosenfeld, who saw class litigation as:
[A] supplement to governmental regulation of large, dif-
fuse markets ... reflect[ing] a consensus that the old, or-
dinary forms of liability were not functioning to discipline
their operations .... In [Kalven's and Rosenfeld's] view
the representative suit would serve to supplement regula-
tory agencies both by requiring wrongdoers to give up
their ill-gotten gains and by ferreting out instances of
Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 669 (cited in note 8).
Id.Id. See also Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals From Private Attorneys General in
Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DePaul L Rev 511, 511 (2001) (encapsulating the articles
written for a symposium on tort law and social policy that "reflect the reality that tort law
has been transformed from compensating private individuals to private law that empow-
ers often disadvantaged individuals with a public purpose"). The term was coined by
Judge Jerome Frank in Associated Industries of New York State, Inc v Ickes, 134 F2d 694,
704 (2d Cir 1943) ("Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Gener-
als."), vacd as moot, 320 US 707 (1943). See also Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 215 n 1 (cited in
note 30). Professor Coffee notes, however, that "[tihe issue in Associated Industries was
one of standing in an administrative law dispute, and no question of private damages was
involved." Id. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that today the label is employed for private
damage actions. Consider id.
" Deborah R. Hensler and Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond "It Just Ain't Worth It".
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 L & Contemp Probs 137, 137
(2001).
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wrong that might have escaped the regulators' obser-
62
vance.
Yeazell notes that "[tihis concept.., has become a leading justifi-
cation for the modern class action" and that "it links [the] concept
of the interest class.., to the general task of law enforcement." 3
Though at first glance the intersection of private litigation
and public goals appears to be both simple and straightforward,
closer examination of the role of the modern private class action
in the service of the public interest reveals that both empirical
and conceptual ambiguities exist about the nature of the public-
private interaction. The former have already been noted by oth-
ers, while the latter appear to have been completely overlooked.
On an empirical level, questions have been raised concerning the
extent to which the private class action effectively fosters the
public interest as a supplement to out-manned and out-gunned
governmental agencies. Many class actions come in the form of
what have been called "coattail" classes-in other words, class
actions that follow successful governmental litigation on either
the civil or criminal fronts, and feed off of the fruits of the gov-
ernmental agency's efforts.64 In such situations, the class action
does not itself ferret out illegal corporate behavior, spurred by the
private economic incentive provided by the creation of damage
remedies. To the contrary, the government has already brought
such illegality to light and successfully imposed punishment. The
' Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action
232 (Yale 1987) (referencing Harry Kalven, Jr. and Maurice Rosenfeld, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U Chi L Rev 684, 721 (1941)).
Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation at 232 (cited in note 62).
See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections On Microsoft, Tobacco,
and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 UC Davis L Rev 1,
5 (2000) (defining "coattail class action" as "a class action that follows government litiga-
tion, seeking to benefit from the government's work"). See also Bryant Garth, Ilene H.
Nagel, and S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives
From an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S Cal L Rev 353, 376 (1988) (ex-
plaining an empirical study demonstrating that in modern class actions, "private attor-
neys tended to 'piggyback' their cases on governmental investigations, even to the extent
of copying the government's complaint") (internal citation omitted); Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at
220-23 (1983) (cited in note 30) ("[Tlhe available empirical evidence does not provide
much support for the thesis that the private attorney general significantly supplements
public law enforcement by increasing the probability of detection .... [A] recurring pattern
is evident under which the private attorney general simply piggybacks on the efforts of
public agencies ... in order to reap the gains from the investigative work undertaken by
these agencies. As a result, the private attorney general does not seem to broaden the
scope of law enforcement, but rather only intensifies the penalty.") (internal citations
omitted).
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private action simply basks in the light of the government
agency's efforts. 5 While some have criticized the coattail class
action," it does not necessarily follow that class actions are point-
less in coattail situations. The class action may well justify its
existence, merely by performing the extremely valuable function
of compensating large numbers of victims in a relatively efficient
manner.67 Moreover, even coattail classes may advance the public
interest by adding to the deterrence of corporate wrongdoing.68
The fact remains, however, that coattail class actions obviously
fail to perform the classic function of privately generated expo-
sure of unlawful behavior traditionally facilitated by the private-
attorney general concept.
It is not entirely clear whether the majority of private class
actions are of the coattail variety.69 For present purposes, how-
ever, one need not resolve that empirical question. We may as-
sume, solely for purposes of argument, that most modern class
actions actually perform the private attorney general function as
it has been traditionally understood, by reinforcing otherwise
overwhelmed governmental policing agencies in the pursuit of
corporate illegality. Serious analytical problems nevertheless con-
tinue to exist, because significant conceptual ambiguities exist in
the private attorney general concept that both courts and schol-
ars have failed to recognize, much less resolve. Close scrutiny of
these ambiguities highlights the manner in which the modern
class action has largely transformed the remedial model that
plays a central role in the design of the underlying substantive
law.
Scholars have already recognized one dichotomy within the
broader concept of the private attorney general. Commentators
' Professor Erichson notes that "[tihe chance of successful private litigation rises
dramatically when government litigation paves the way." Erichson, 34 UC Davis L Rev at
5 (internal citation omitted) (cited in note 64).
See id at 3 ("[S]ome observers object to the easy ride that plaintiffs and their law-
yers get by piggybacking on government actions."). Professor Erichson points to an edito-
rial in the Wall Street Journal labeling class counsel in the Microsoft class actions as "tort
parasites" and a reference in the Washington Post to class action lawyers as "predatory"
and the class actions, themselves, as "simple buzzardry." Id (internal citations omitted).
67 See id (noting that coattail class actions "offer a relatively fair and efficient mecha-
nism for extending the benefits of government legal work to provide redress to injured
citizens").
' See also Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 224 (cited in note 30) ("This phenomenon of 'free
riding' by the private plaintiff on governmental enforcement efforts is by no means with-
out social utility....").
" But see Erichson, 34 UC Davis L Rev at 5 (cited in note 64) ("Coattail class actions
are a common feature of mass litigation.").
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
have contrasted what they describe as the "Lone Ranger" and
"bounty hunter" forms of private attorney general." The "lone
ranger" refers to the private litigant who is motivated in his at-
tempt to serve the public interest primarily, if not exclusively, by
idealistic or communitarian concerns. Of course, in light of the
constitutional requirement of injury in fact,71 even these plaintiffs
must be able to assert some form of personal injury and private
right which they seek to vindicate by the pursuit of judicial ac-
tion. But for these plaintiffs, such injury serves for the most part
as a means to a broader, idealistic end. The "bounty hunter," on
the other hand, refers to the private litigants who care little for
broader concerns of public interest but are instead focused exclu-
sively upon the pursuit of their own private interest. As already
noted, however, even litigants falling within this latter category
may serve the public interest as an incident to their pursuit of
their own private rights. 2 For this reason, recognition of this di-
chotomy within the category of private attorney general actions
may have more sociological than legal import.
What no one appears to have recognized, however, is the le-
gally and theoretically significant dichotomy that exists within
the concept of what have been described, somewhat overinclu-
sively, as "bounty hunter" class actions.73 As already noted, this
category is thought to include those actions brought exclusively
for the purpose of personal gain, rather than for broader public
interest concerns. But there exist two very different subcategories
of such "personal interest" litigation. One is properly described as
"compensatory" litigation. In these cases, one can readily pre-
sume that those bringing suit-both plaintiffs and their attor-
neys-are motivated exclusively by considerations of narrow self-
interest: the plaintiffs seek to make themselves economically
70 Garth, Nagel, and Plager, 61 S Cal L Rev at 353-54 (cited in note 64) (noting that
sometimes the private attorney general is considered a "Lone Ranger" and at other times,
a "bounty hunter").
7' See text accompanying notes 57-59.
" See text accompanying notes 34-35.
71 Professor Coffee, for example, has written that "the private attorney general is
someone who sues 'to vindicate the public interest' by representing collectively those who
individually could not afford the costs of litigation; and as every law student knows, our
society places extensive reliance upon such private attorneys general to enforce the federal
antitrust and securities laws, to challenge corporate self-dealing in derivative actions, and
to protect a host of other statutory policies." Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 216 (internal citation
omitted) (cited in note 30). As I will demonstrate, however, this description of the private
attorney general concept improperly mixes compensatory suits and those brought solely
due to governmentally created economic incentives.
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whole by obtaining compensation for their injuries caused by the
defendants, and the attorneys serve as "hired guns," doing noth-
ing more than receiving compensation for performing a service on
behalf of a client. Such suits may nevertheless be categorized as
private attorney general actions, because they may well have the
incidental impact-perhaps even intended by the legislative crea-
tion of the private right-of exposing and punishing law viola-
tions. In this sense, private litigation serves the public interest,
regardless of the motivation of those bringing suit.
The "self-interest" litigation category of private attorney gen-
eral actions includes an additional subcategory, also appropri-
ately described as "bounty hunter" litigation. But it is important
to distinguish this narrow subcategory from the primary category
of "personal interest" litigation itself. Neither in the Old West nor
in more recent times has a bounty hunter acted on behalf of the
interests of specific private individuals, nor have they sought
compensation for injury caused to themselves by others.74 Bounty
hunters, instead, have sought to serve the interests of the com-
munity by apprehending (and sometimes punishing) those who
disturb or threaten the public peace. In exchange, the community
has rewarded them. It is reasonable to assume that invariably it
was the reward, rather than a sense of civic-mindedness, that has
traditionally driven the bounty hunters (though of course the two
motivations are by no means mutually exclusive). It is therefore
probably fair to say that the work of the bounty hunters effec-
tively illustrates the intersection of self-interest and public inter-
est. But this intersection does not involve the additional purpose
of simultaneously compensating the victims of the apprehended
wrongdoer. Thus, the appropriate litigation analogy to the bounty
hunters is not the private compensatory action, for the simple
reason that the work of bounty hunters has never been thought to
include efforts to obtain compensation for private victims.
A more appropriate legal analogy to the bounty hunter is the
qui tam action. In its modern form, the qui tam action is embod-
ied in the False Claims Act, which authorizes private citizens (re-
ferred to as "relators") to bring suit against defendants who have
knowingly defrauded the United States government.75 In order to
induce such private action, the Act authorizes the private plain-
See text accompanying notes 32-35.
31 USC §§3729, 3730(b) (2000).
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tiff to recover a percentage of the proceeds from the action.76 In
this manner, "the qui tam provision works to provide an incentive
for private litigants to expose the fraud and benefit from the re-
covery."77 Commentators have noted that "the number of qui tam
suits filed is accelerating each year and recoveries are steadily
trending upward."78 The qui tam plaintiff has suffered no per-
sonal injury at the hands of the defendant that she is seeking to
remedy through adjudication. Rather, the plaintiff's apparent
motivation is to obtain the reward offered by the government for
ferreting out and judicially punishing fraud against the govern-
ment.79 In this sense, the qui tam action represents an adjudica-
tory parallel to the actions and motivations of the Old West's
bounty hunter. °
Once one understands the subtle but important distinctions
among the categories and subcategories of private attorney gen-
eral actions, it is appropriate to examine the modern class action
in light of this background. Such an examination reveals that in
its present form, the modern class action includes cases that fall
within all three of the relevant categories: idealistic, self-
interested, and its two sub-categories, private compensatory and
" The size of the percentage depends on whether or not the government intervenes in
the action. 31 USC § 3730(d). The Act gives the government sixty days from the filing date
of the suit to investigate the relator's claim and decide whether or not to intervene and
assume primary responsibility. 31 USC § 3730(c)(1).
7' Gretchen L. Forney, Note, Qui tam Suits: Defining the Rights and Roles of the Gov-
ernment and the Relator Under the False Claims Act, 82 Minn L Rev 1357, 1364 (1998)
(internal citation omitted). The same commentator points out that "Congress amended the
[False Claims Act] in 1986 with the stated intent of generating more private suits. The
1986 Amendments strengthened the position of the qui tam plaintiff in three ways: (1) qui
tam plaintiffs were given more power to initiate and prosecute claims, (2) financial incen-
tives were enhanced, and (3) protections against employer retaliation reduced the risks
inherent in exposing one's employer." Id at 1366-67 (internal citations omitted).
" Marc S. Raspanti and David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the
Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 Temple L Rev 23, 43 (1998)
(charting the increasing number of qui tam filings from 1987 to 1997 according to Justice
Department figures).
" Once again, I should emphasize that I am making no judgments about the personal
motivations of individual relators. It is, of course, conceivable that a particular relator is
motivated as much or more by personal concern about fraud against the government as by
the percentage of the proceeds that he expects to obtain as a result of the qui tam action.
As a rough rule of thumb, however, it is fair to predict that the financial incentive is, at
the very least, a significant element in the relator's motivation. Apparently the govern-
ment, in offering the reward, is proceeding on such an assumption.
'o The qui tam analogy may not be a perfect one, since the qui tam relator does more
then simply expose private illegality. In addition, she seeks to obtain restitution on behalf
of the government. However, the relator is not seeking compensatory damages for private
victims, and, unlike the plaintiff class action lawyers, the relator is considered to be a real
party in interest.
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bounty hunter. The problem is that the substantive law that the
class action purports to enforce invariably fails to authorize pri-
vate attorney general actions of the bounty hunter variety.1
Moreover, at no point does anyone acknowledge the true charac-
ter of those class actions that properly fall within the bounty
hunter category. Rather, such actions are universally described,
quite inaccurately, to be of the private compensatory variety. This
is so despite the fact that in many such actions the only individu-
als involved in and financially motivated by the possibility of re-
covery are the attorneys, who have never suffered a legally cogni-
zable and compensable injury at the hands of the defendants. The
following section provides a detailed examination of the modern
class action's legal structure, in an effort to explain how what
purports to be a private compensatory action and what legally is
permitted to be nothing more than a private compensatory action
in reality transforms itself into a disguised bounty hunter action.
II. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION As A BOUNTY HUNTER SUIT
If one seeks to determine exactly how the modern class action
fits within the framework of private attorney general actions, it is
first appropriate to distinguish between the civil rights class ac-
tion, in which the class seeks primarily injunctive relief, author-
ized by Rule 23(b)(2),82 and those class actions brought primarily
in order to compensate a class of victims.83 The former largely fall
8 See text accompanying notes 74-75 (describing commentators' overbroad definition
of "bounty hunter" concept to include both private compensatory and true bounty hunter
actions).
' FRCP 23(b)(2) (authorizing class actions where the party opposing the class has
acted in a manner generally applicable to the class, thereby justifying injunctive relief.
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments indicate that the modem civil
rights class action served as the inspiration for this category, though by its terms the
category is not substantively confined to civil rights claims. See FRCP 23; Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 FRD 69, 102 (1966). Rule 23(b)(2) class actions may be
brought even if damages are sought, as long as injunctive relief remains the primary relief
sought. Charles Alan Wright, et al, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1775, at 463-70 (West
2d ed 1986).
Compensatory class actions may fall either within the (b)(1) or (b)(3) categories.
The former category, which does not necessarily require individual notice to class mem-
bers and in which class members do not have the option of removing themselves from the
class, exists when either the individual class members or the party opposing the class
would be placed in a legally or practically precarious position absent the existence of the
class action. See FRCP 23(b)(1)(A)-(B). The latter category, which requires individual
notice and provides class members with the right to opt out of the class, includes cases in
which the rationale for class treatment is confined largely to the closely parallel nature of
the facts and claims. FRCP 23(b)(3). For the most part, my analysis applies to cases falling
within the (b)(3) category.
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under the "idealistic" heading, 4 while the latter generally fall
within the "self-interested" category. Of course, even a damages
class action may be motivated in part by ideological concerns on
the part of both class members and class attorneys. For example,
individuals who firmly believe that big business must be curbed
for the betterment of the community may eagerly pursue an ac-
tion for damages as much to bring their political principles into
reality as to acquire compensation. We nevertheless may draw
this dichotomy because the distinction will be accurate more often
than not and, in any event, at this level the implications of the
distinction are purely sociological, rather than legal. What may
well have significant legal consequences, however, is the distinc-
tion between the two different subcategories of self-interested
litigation: private compensatory and bounty hunter. Yet as pres-
ently structured, Rule 23 effectively authorizes both forms.
A. The Effect of Opt-Out on the Modern Class Action
By establishing membership in the class through the inher-
ently passive procedure of opt-out," Rule 23 creates a framework
for litigation that undermines the essential premises of the pri-
vate compensatory model of adjudication. Pursuant to the private
compensatory model, the substantive law simultaneously pro-
scribes specified behavior on the part of a category of actors and
vests in the victims of that behavior the individual right to sue
the wrongdoer in order to be made whole. None of the laws in
question draws any distinction between individual and class inju-
ries. To the contrary, they do nothing more than vest compensa-
tory rights in individual victims. Thus, in its pre-litigation state,
the right to sue belongs solely to the individual victim. Rule 23
permits those individual claims to be aggregated in a single ac-
tion in order to bring about litigation convenience and provide a
viable procedural means of vindicating the underlying substan-
tive claims. Yet because the rule transforms individual victims
into class members solely on the basis of their failure to remove
themselves from the class, rather than by manifestation of their
'4 It is important not to confuse "idealistic" with "altruistic," or to assume that an
action is not motivated by self-interest merely because one finds that self-interest to be
ideologically appealing. Even seemingly idealistic class actions often are motivated by self-
interest, as where African-Americans seek to enjoin continued discrimination. Indeed, in
light of our system's injury-in-fact requirement, such actions cannot be brought absent at
least some level of self-interest. See text accompanying notes 57-58.
' FRCP 23(c)(2).
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affirmative assent to participate, it virtually invites the creation
of a class in which, as a practical matter, numerous class mem-
bers have not only not assented to suit, but are completely un-
aware that they are even suing. The upshot of this process, then,
is that quite probably numerous plaintiffs-the individuals in
whom the cause of action has been vested in the first place-are
made members of the class without the slightest awareness of the
suit.
6
One may fashion several conceivable responses to this attack
on opt-out. Initially, scholars have suggested that the class is
more appropriately viewed as an "entity," rather than as an ag-
gregation of single individuals. If one accepts this conceptual
characterization, a right of opt-out makes no sense: as a small cog
in the entity's wheel, the individual plaintiff logically possesses
no individual right to decide for herself whether or not to bring
suit.
David Shapiro is the leading scholarly advocate of the "en-
tity" model of the modern class action." Shapiro first notes that
"in the foreground of any discussion of the class action ... is the
continuing debate between advocates of individual autonomy in
litigation and the proponents of what has been praised as 'collec-
tive' justice."88 He adds:
The principal focus of the debate has been the extent to
which the class action ... should be viewed as not involv-
ing the claimants as a number of individuals, or even as
an "aggregation" of individuals, but rather as an entity in
itself for the critical purpose of determining the nature of
the lawsuit. 9
Shapiro concludes that "the 'class as entity' forces should ulti-
mately carry the day.""0 He argues that:
' See Robert Mauk, Lawsuit Abuse: Public's Welfare Hurt When Lawyers Help Them-
selves, Charleston Gazette 5A (Apr 28, 1997) ("Many people probably aren't aware of this
but, under current rules, you may already be part of a class-action lawsuit and not even
know it .... [Sluch suits are like those record and book clubs your parents warned you
about-until you say stop, you are automatically included as a member.").
' The term "entity" appears to have been coined by Professor Cooper. See Edward H.
Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 NYU L Rev 12, 26 (1996).
David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class As Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L
Rev 913, 916 (1998) (internal citation omitted).
" Id at 917. See also id at 921 (finding the entity model "the more appropriate in the
class action setting"). Professor Shapiro acknowledges, however, that "substantial institu-
tional problems remain when it comes to implementation." Id at 917.
Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 917 (cited in note 88).
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This conclusion is not quite so radical as it may seem at
first, since the idea of the collectivity as an entity is a fa-
miliar one in other settings. Thus, a whole range of volun-
tary private associations---congregations, trade unions,
joint stock companies, corporations-and on a less "volun-
tary" level, municipalities and other governmental enti-
ties, have long been recognized as litigants in their own
right-entities whose members may have at best only a
limited say in what is litigated, in who represents the or-
ganization, and on what terms the controversy is ulti-
mately resolved.9
Shapiro concedes that:
The analogy is not perfect of course. Shareholders in a
corporation, for example, have chosen to become a part of
the corporation for a variety of reasons .... A member of a
class that exists only for the purposes of a litigation may
be dragged kicking and screaming into a lawsuit he does
not want, or at least would prefer to conduct on his own.9 2
He responds to his own criticism of the entity theory, however, by
pointing out that "some of these entities are not so 'voluntary'
after all."
93
In anticipating and responding to criticism of the entity the-
ory, Professor Shapiro effectively underscores the extent to which
his entire analysis focuses upon an analytical perspective that is
completely beside the point in deciding on the validity of the
modern class action. Shapiro, recall, sees the debate as one be-
tween individual autonomy and collective justice. He attempts to
fight off anticipated attacks on the entity theory that are
grounded exclusively in basic autonomy rights of the individual to
control his own litigation by pointing to numerous examples of
existing entities in which individual members lack autonomy.
But the fundamental problem with his analogies is not so much
that, unlike the class, membership in these organizations is usu-
Id at 921.
9 Id.
Id at 921-22. In particular, Professor Shapiro notes that trade union members may
not be free to withdraw from litigation pursued by the union-which represents all work-
ers, whether they voted for the union or not-without leaving the job entirely. Similarly,
residents of a municipality cannot freely withdraw from it without the extreme action of
moving home and family.
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ally voluntary, but that these organizations are themselves the
creations of substantive law that directly regulates private indi-
viduals' primary behavior. In contrast, the class action exists as a
procedural device designed to implement pre-existing legal regu-
lations of citizens' primary behavior. If the laws establishing
these regulations vest compensatory rights not in an entity of
plaintiffs but rather in individual victims, then to view the class
as an entity effectively transforms the essence of the pre-existing
private right.
The most significant problem with the entity theory, then, is
not that it undermines some abstract value of individual auton-
omy, but rather that it allows the class action procedure to trans-
form the "DNA" of the underlying substantive law that it is seek-
ing to enforce. There can be little question that in most current
plaintiff class actions, the underlying substantive law does not
create a cause of action in an entity, but rather in the individual
victims. After all, the substantive law enforced in a class action
generally draws no distinction between the compensatory rights
asserted by a plaintiff in an individual suit and those asserted by
a class of plaintiffs. Thus, to view the debate surrounding the en-
tity model as a conflict of process-based theories, as Shapiro does,
overlooks the true political harm to which adoption of an entity
model gives rise.
In any event, there is no basis in the text of Rule 23(b)(3) to
support the view that the Rule was somehow intended to trans-
form the nature of the substantive rights being enforced from
those vested in the individual plaintiff to rights vested in some
ethereal entity of plaintiffs. Indeed, while I criticize the Rule for
its use of an opt-out procedure," if the Rule's drafters had some
form of entity model in mind, they presumably would not have
permitted opt-out at all. Instead, the entity of the class would
have been permitted to act as the unitary force that it inherently
is.9" To describe the class as an entity, then, represents nothing
See text accompanying notes 180-81.
Perhaps a stronger argument can be fashioned that the drafters did, in fact, intend
classes certified pursuant to either 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) to constitute entity-based classes,
since no provision for the right of opt-out, or even of required notification, was made for
these classes. See Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 925-26 (cited in note 88) (arguing
that "the knowledge that these actions generally involve the group as an entity may well
have led the rulemakers in 1966 to make such classes 'mandatory'"). On the other hand,
arguably the lack of opt-out rights in these classes could be justified by the pragmatically-
based compelling need to resolve the entire matter in a single proceeding, because of the
harmful impact on either absent class members or the party opposing the class in the
absence of class treatment. Such reasoning, however, does not respond to my critique
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more than a convenient, after-the-fact rationalization for what is
largely a political effort to facilitate the successful operation of
the modern class action. Whatever one concludes about the nor-
mative social issues implicated by the modern class action, it is
clear that those conclusions should not enable the judiciary to
contravene the essential nature of the underlying substantive
rights." Adoption of an entity view of the class action, however,
does just that.
A less abstract response to my attack on the use of opt-out, in
preference to opt-in, focuses on the realities of the modern class
action. This argument posits that the opt-out procedure provides
more than sufficient protection against the inclusion of unwilling
class members, because it is predictable, ex ante, that as a gen-
eral matter class members would have no reason not to include
themselves in the class. Scholars have argued that under an opt-
out procedure, at least where the individual claims are not suffi-
ciently large to justify the costs of a separate suit, an individual
plaintiff notified of the class action:
has a choice between two courses of action. She can do
nothing, in which case she will receive a check in the mail
if the suit is successful and will incur no costs if the suit
fails. Or she can go to the trouble of opting out of the ac-
tion, in which case she will receive nothing whether or not
the suit is successful. Such a decision is not hard to make.
Nearly everyone who understands the nature of this
choice will elect to do nothing and thereby remain part of
the class action.97
Although this argument was not fashioned specifically in the con-
text of the opt-in/out-opt debate,98 one could reasonably rely on it
grounded in the undermining of the substantive-procedural balance brought about by the
denial of opt-out when the underlying substantive law creates only individual rights. The
Supreme Court has cast doubt on mandatory classes under certain circumstances, because
Gf their negative impact on litigants' procedural autonomy and therefore construed the
scope of the mandatory categories narrowly. See Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815,
842-43 (1999) (stating that a limiting construction of the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class
'avoids serious constitutional concerns raised by the mandatory class resolution of indi-
vidual legal claims").
See Part II.
97 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role In Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58
U Chi L Rev 1, 28 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
"' Professors Macey and Miller, it should be noted, developed the argument in support
of the position that individualized notice in small claim class actions should not be re-
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to support a preference for opt-out. Because of the overwhelming
likelihood that a reasonable class member would choose to in-
clude herself in the class, one may appropriately proceed on this
presumption, unless and until the class member affirmatively
tells us otherwise.
Despite its superficially appealing nature, this argument is
fundamentally flawed, because it ignores the structural context
in which the question about class members' intent is asked in the
first place. Initially, it is important to point out that under the
private rights model of adjudication, associated with the private
compensatory remedial model, the question is not whether a
plaintiff has any objection to suit, but whether a plaintiff affirma-
tively desires to sue. A private compensatory damage remedy is
qualitatively different from a "guardian" model, under which the
state or a specified private individual or entity is vested with le-
gal authority to protect an individual or class of individuals
deemed, for one reason or another, incapable of protecting their
own interests. When a legislature provides for a private damage
remedy, it presumably understands that the remedy is not trig-
gered unless and until the injured victim decides that the injury
is of sufficient magnitude to overcome inertia against suit. To be
sure, the availability of the class action procedure makes suit for
small claims more feasible, by reducing the costs and burdens of
suit through the process of the aggregation of similar claims. But
it does not follow that because of the class action procedure, the
plaintiff who exercises her substantively vested compensatory
remedy need no longer make the choice to sue.
An advocate of opt-out might respond, however, that the logi-
cal implications of the presumption concerning class members'
intent are not merely that the individual plaintiffs have no objec-
tion to suit, but that they affirmatively desire to sue. In support
of this contention, one may reason that a class member presented
with the option would choose to sue, for the simple reason that
she would have nothing to lose by suing. A class member who
sues could never be in a worse position than if she had failed to
sue, and may actually be placed in a better position, if only mini-
mally, by ultimately receiving some form of compensation for her
injuries, regardless of how small or useless.99
quired. See id. They were not specifically focusing upon the opt-out question. See generally
id.
, See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U Chi L Rev 877, 906 (1987) ("Con-
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At best,0 ° this argument works in the context of what Profes-
sor Coffee has labeled "Type B" class actions, in other words
"those in which no claim would be independently marketable."'
In Professor Coffee's "Type A" category, which includes those
classes "in which each claim would be independently marketable
even in the absence of the class action device,"' ° an individual
plaintiff may well have a great deal to lose by remaining in the
class, because in doing so he waives his due process right to con-
trol his own litigation, 3 and the possibility of such an individual
suit is substantial. In virtually no other context are constitutional
rights deemed waived by nothing more than a litigant's failure to
act.0 4 Yet that is exactly the result of the use of opt-out in these
"Type A" class actions.
Even in Professor Coffee's "Type B" class actions, where indi-
vidual claims are presumed to be too small to justify individual
suit , °' 5 it is by no means clear that the argument that plaintiffs
have nothing to lose justifies a presumption that absent class
members will affirmatively wish to sue. At least as likely is that
he will simply have no interest in the possibility of suit, one way
or the other, for the simple reason that even under a best case
scenario, he is not likely to be materially better off by suing than
sider the position of a plaintiff whose claim faces either serious problems of factual proof
or legal adequacy or who has suffered relatively minor damages. Rationally, such a plain-
tiff should gravitate to the class action because she has no alternative.").
1W But see text accompanying notes 106-07.
1o' Coffee, 54 U Chi L Rev at 905 (cited in note 99). See also Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L
Rev at 923-24 (cited in note 88) (defining small claim class actions as "those cases in
which the claim of any individual class member for harm done is too small to provide any
rational justification to the individual for incurring the costs of litigation"). Professor
Shapiro points, as an example, to "a claim on behalf of many purchasers that defendants
have engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy to violate the federal antitrust laws. The case
would easily fit the small claims category if, even after damages are trebled, the amount
due any single purchaser would not exceed, say, $100." Id at 924.
102 Coffee, 54 U Chi L Rev at 904 (cited in note 99).
'o See Marcus, et al, Civil Procedure at 1174 (cited in note 2) ("The concept of privity
is rooted in due process, as a non-party should not be found by a judgment unless he had
an opportunity to be heard.").
104 Compare Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 673 (1974) (pointing out that "construc-
tive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional
rights"). The one exception that comes to mind is a default judgment, where a judgment is
entered against a defendant who has taken absolutely no action. However, such a result
may be justified on the grounds that any other treatment of a defendant's failure to re-
spond would effectively transform a notice of suit into an R.S.V.P.
105 See Coffee, 54 U Chi L Rev at 905 (cited in note 99). Professor Coffee also describes
"Type C" class actions, "in which there are both marketable and unmarketable claims." Id
at 905-06. He notes that "[allthough Type B suits correspond most closely to the tradi-
tional rationale for class actions, Type C actions are probably much more common." Id at
906 (internal citation omitted).
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by not suing. Harm or benefit classified as de minimis, and there-
fore deemed legally and practically irrelevant, is a concept well
established in the law. Similarly, a small claim is, as a general
matter, likely to be viewed by a potential plaintiff as de minimis
and therefore not worthy of legal action, even absent any litiga-
tion costs or burdens. To be sure, the potential class member may
not actually oppose suit; quite probably, he just does not care. But
the litigation inertia inherent in the private compensatory model
of the governing substantive law requires the victim to exercise
his right to sue. A litigant not even willing to complete and mail a
simple "yes-or-no" form could hardly be said to have chosen to
exercise his right to sue. Thus, one cannot properly presume,
even in a "Type B" class action, that absent plaintiffs would nec-
essarily choose to become members of the class.
Opponents of opt-in have argued that it would have a nega-
tive impact on minority and low-income individuals, who "might
be disproportionately affected by an opt-in requirement."10 6 Evi-
dently, the reasoning is that minority and low-income individuals
are less likely to be able either to understand a class action notice
or to make a sound decision about the suit if they do understand
it. Such paternalism, however, is inconsistent with the basic
premises of a democratic system because it proves too much. The
same reasoning would seem to lead to the conclusion that those
who "know better" should be able to exercise the vote for those
citizens who are unable to perceive their own interests. Obvi-
ously, such logic flies in the face of foundational normative prem-
ises of democratic theory, grounded in respect for the individual's
ability to decide for herself what her best interests are. Selective
paternalism for minority individuals is even more offensive to the
premises of democracy, which are grounded in assumptions of
equality.
On occasion, government, acting as parens patriae, may
choose to intercede in order to protect the interests of its citi-
zens.0 7 Such situations occur when, due to high informational or
transaction costs, individuals are unlikely to be unable to per-
ceive or protect their own legal interests. It is conceivable that in
" Hensler, et al, Class Action Dilemmas at 476 (cited in note 21). They describe this
result as "a worrisome possibility." Id. This concern provided at least a partial motivation
for the 1966 Advisory Committee's decision to use opt-out. See Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure, 39 FRD at 102-04.
" See, for example, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown
Group, Inc, 517 US 544, 557 (1996) (referring to representative litigation, brought by state
governments in their capacity as parens patriae).
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particular areas Congress could choose to create a semi-parens
patriae action, allowing individual plaintiffs to opt out under
specified circumstances. But these situations clearly involve sub-
stantive policy choices that generally have not been made in the
governing substantive law enforced in modern class actions.
Those laws, instead, create a compensatory right in individual
victims, to be asserted by those victims in their discretion. To al-
low a rule that purports to do nothing more than create a proce-
dural mechanism to transform pre-existing private compensatory
rights into a crude form of parens patriae action is to abuse the
rules of procedure.'
Close examination of the 1966 Advisory Committee's ration-
ale for adopting an opt-out procedure demonstrates the manner
in which the Committee's choice was designed to subvert the es-
sential remedial structure of the governing substantive law. Ac-
cording to Judge Levi, the Committee apparently had in mind
small-claim, consumer class actions in which no one class mem-
ber would have a sufficient interest to litigate an individual claim
and in which the forces of inertia might be greater than a poten-
tial class member's desire to participate, given the small stakes
involved.0 9 Benjamin Kaplan, who served as Reporter for the
1966 Committee, wrote that for the "small people" who may be
prevented from affirmatively opting in due to "ignorance, timid-
ity, [or] unfamiliarity with business or legal matters," the class
action "serves something like the function of an administrative
proceeding where scattered individuals are represented by the
Government."' 1° But no matter how small the individual claims,
their very existence derives from the substantive law's vesting of
those rights in the individual victim. According to governing sub-
stantive laws, those rights may be judicially enforced only if indi-
vidual victims choose to exercise them. If the individual injuries
recognized by the substantive law are so small as not to justify
the individual victim's decision to enforce them, then the rights
will not be enforced.
Procedural rules may have the effect of making suit more
attractive by reducing adjudicatory transaction costs through an
" It should be noted that the modern class action does not constitute a classic parens
patriae action, since it is private attorneys, not chosen by or representative of the elector-
ate, who both make the decision to sue on behalf of individuals in need of special protec-
tion and conduct the suit.
Levi, Memorandum to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee at 2-3 (cited in note 5).
11 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1, 81 Harv L Rev 356, 398 (1967).
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increase in the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.
However, unless the substantive law establishes some form of
public guardian empowered to sue on behalf of injured victims
the choice to sue remains in the victim. Indeed, Professor Kap-
lan's analogy of the class action to an administrative proceeding
reveals his understanding that the small-claim class action is
designed to transform the private compensatory remedy provided
for in the governing substantive law into a wholly different con-
cept.
B. The Effect of Meaningless Relief on the Modern Class Action
The second element in the ominous "bookends" of Rule
23(b)(3) class actions is the relief ultimately provided by the liti-
gation. While in theory a small-claim 23(b)(3) class action may
ultimately give rise to the award of compensatory relief to absent
class members, as a practical matter this result is highly
unlikely, if not virtually impossible. The practical problems are
twofold. First, even if monetary damages have been awarded to
the class,"' in many situations individual plaintiffs are able to
recover their awards only upon the filing of complex claim
forms.112 It is unrealistic, to say the least, to expect that absent
plaintiffs, made members of the class purely by their passivity,
will have the incentive to overcome the severe transaction costs
to filing a claim in order to obtain an award that was not large
enough to justify the relatively simple act of opting into the class
in the first place. 113 That fact does not matter, however, because
no one realistically understands the purpose of the small-claims
class action to be the compensation of class members.
Moreover, it is a practical reality today that relatively few
class actions proceed to judgment, and it is also a practical reality
"' But see text accompanying notes 114-117 (discussing coupon settlements).
.1. See Gail Hillebrand and Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures In Large Consumer
Class Actions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 28 Santa Clara L Rev 747, 747 (1988)
("Settlements and judgments in class action cases have often required class members to
submit claims in order to share in the proceeds of the recovery. Recent cases suggest that
claims procedures are ill-suited to consumer class actions in which the class size is very
large and the amount of damages per class member is relatively small. These cases are
characterized by very low claims rates.").
..3 It is thus not surprising that in her empirical study of class actions, Professor
Hensler found that "class members do not always come forward to claim the full amount
defendants make available for compensation." Hensler, et al, Class Actions Dilemmas at
459 (cited in note 21) (noting that in cases where settlement required class members to
come forward to claim modest amounts of compensation, the fraction of compensation
funds actually disbursed was modest to negligible).
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that many defendants refuse to agree to any settlement that re-
quires them to pay money to class members. Instead, for the most
part, these cases are settled by the use of coupon settlements,
where, in the words of Professor Leslie, "defendants eliminate
their legal liability in exchange for issuing coupons to class mem-
bers redeemable for savings on a subsequent purchase of the de-
fendant's goods or services.""4 According to Professor Leslie,
"[cioupons are in fact often worthless despite their deceptively
high value. In many cases, the coupons are laden with restric-
tions intended to make redemption difficult.""' He further notes
that "[cilass counsel do not prevent these value-reducing restric-
tions in settlement coupons because the attorneys are paid in
cash, while judges usually focus on the face value of the coupons,
not the restrictions on their use. '1 6
One might respond that Rule 23 already provides adequate
means to prevent settlements that mistreat class members in this
way. Under Rule 23(e), the court must approve the fairness of
every class action settlement."7 Where a settlement provides
class members with a virtually non-existent benefit, one would
expect a reviewing court to function as an adequate safety net.
But the terms of the Rule provide a reviewing court with abso-
lutely no guidance in determining a proposed settlement's fair-
ness. It is not unlikely that, in making its fairness ruling, the
court is often driven more by the desire to avoid the costs and
burdens of a class action's adjudication than the need to assure
itself that class members have been truly compensated."8 The
.. See Leslie, 49 UCLA L Rev at 993 (cited in note 24). According to the same com-
mentator, "[cloupon-based settlements most commonly appear in antitrust and consumer
class actions." Id at 995. Professor Leslie notes that "[cloupon settlements appear to be
increasing in popularity." Id (internal citation omitted).
"' Id.
.. Leslie, 49 UCLA L Rev at 993 (cited in note 24). Other commentators have reacted
with greater outrage in their assessment of the widespread use of coupon settlements. See
Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, and Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide
Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37
Harv J on Legis 483, 483 (2000) ("Consumers are being taken for a ride by a renegade
legal practice that often compensates them nominally-for example, with coupons-while
their lawyers take home millions of dollars in fees.") (internal citations omitted).
"' FRCP 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court....").
"" See, for example, In re Mexico Money Transfer Litigation, 267 F3d 743, 748 (7th Cir
2001) (upholding approval of a coupon settlement), cert denied, 535 US 1018 (2002).
Not all reviewing courts have blindly accepted the fairness of proposed coupon
settlements, however. See, for example, In re General Motors Corp Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F3d 768, 803 (3d Cir 1995) (rejecting lower court
approval of a class action settlement, because "a number of factors militate against the
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problem appears to have reached even greater heights in a group
of cases in which courts have approved settlements that effec-
tively provided absent class members with virtually nothing at all
while simultaneously awarding class counsel significant attor-
neys' fees.'19
This is not necessarily to imply that in all class actions, ab-
sent class members receive no meaningful relief.2 . For purposes
of argument, I will presume that in a number of modern class
actions the class members actually receive the relief to which
they are legally entitled, or at least meaningful compensatory
relief. The fact remains, however, that a not insignificant number
of modern class actions are resolved without class members re-
ceiving what could rationally be deemed real compensation. As
presently structured, Rule 23 allows such a result to take place.
In making these points about the structure of Rule 23 and
the troubling trend to which it has given rise, it is important to
recall the theoretical context in which these issues are raised.
The goal of this discussion has not been to make a point about
plaintiff class action lawyers' failure to satisfy their obligations to
their clients. Nor has it been to criticize the economic inefficiency
of the class action device. The point, rather, is that, in all too
many class action suits, there is no class being represented-at
least not in any realistic sense of the term. Instead, the attorneys
themselves are the real parties in interest.
conclusion that the class's interests were sufficiently pursued"). The Third Circuit found
that
the settlement arguably did not maximize the class members' interests. Every
owner received a coupon whose value could only be realized by purchasing a new
truck. Significant obstacles existed to the development of a secondary market in
the transfer certificates given that the transfer restrictions and the certificates'
limited lifespan minimize the value of the transfer option.
Id. The court also noted that 'class counsel effected a settlement that would yield very
substantial rewards to them after what, in comparison to the $9.5 million fee, was little
work." Id.
"' An organization in Southern West Virginia, Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse, has
catalogued some of the most abusive examples, though it should be noted that some (but
not all) of them occurred in state court. See Mauk, Lawsuit Abuse, Charleston Gazette at
5A (cited in note 86).
"' Professor Hensler, discussing her empirical study of class actions, notes that "[tihe
wide range of outcomes that we found in the lawsuits contradicts the view that damage
class actions invariably produce little for class members, and that class action attorneys
routinely garner the lion's share of settlements." Hensler, et al, Class Action Dilemmas at
427 (cited in note 21). She points out, however, that "class counsel were sometimes simply
interested in finding a settlement price that the defendants would agree to-rather than
in finding out what class members had lost, what defendants had gained, and how likely it
was that defendants would actually be held liable if the suit were to go to trial." Id.
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One possible response to this argument is that the construc-
tive non-existence of a class is far different from the class's tech-
nical non-existence. In suits here described as constructively non-
existent, it might be argued that at least certain class members
do, in fact, know they are plaintiffs in a class action, and at least
certain class members actually receive a compensatory benefit
from the class action's resolution. This differs significantly, the
argument would proceed, from a case being described as a class
action where literally no class exists at all. From this perspective,
the existence of something resembling a class, no matter how fee-
ble, suffices to satisfy the dictates of the compensatory remedial
model provided for by the substantive law. But rarely is modern
legal analysis satisfied by reliance on technicalities. Where an
examination of practical reality demonstrates that plaintiff class
members neither chose to sue nor receive meaningful compensa-
tion as a result of suit, the problems of democratic theory that I
raise are triggered. My argument thus turns on the assumption
that where the relief awarded to a class will rarely be acquired by
individual class members or is of little practical use to the over-
whelming majority of class members, it is reasonable, for pur-
poses of both legal and political analysis, to characterize the
plaintiff class in such a suit as non-existent.
A second response to my criticism of modern class action
structure and practice is that, as Professor Hensler has argued,
"if the primary goal is regulatory enforcement, carefully matching
damages to losses is not a great concern. As long as defendants
pay enough to deter bad behavior, economic theorists tell us, it
does not matter how their payment is distributed." '21 But a re-
sponse to a critique grounded in democratic theory that derives
from precepts of economic theory amounts to an analytical non
sequitur. An exclusive focus on achieving the goal of deterrence
ignores the often fundamental political differences in the means
chosen to accomplish that goal. Attaining deterrence by resort to
one remedial model may give rise to socio-political consequences
that differ significantly from those caused by another remedial
model. It is just that transformation, I submit, that modern class
action procedure has brought about, or at least permitted to de-
velop. Examination of the nature of remedial models and the
manner in which the political selection among them implicates
the concerns of democratic theory establishes that the mere fact
121 Id.
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that a class action may achieve deterrence does not automatically
resolve the problems of democracy raised by the modern class
action.
III. REMEDIAL MODELS, BOUNTY HUNTER SUITS, AND THE
DEMOCRATIC DIFFICULTY
A. The Political Consequences of the Choice of Remedial Model
The legislative decision as to what behavior on the part of the
citizenry is to be proscribed or restricted quite naturally answers
only some of the normative issues of social policy implicated by
legislative action. The abstract prohibition of behavior, even if it
comes from government, will be nothing more than hortatory
unless the legislation imposing that prohibition enforces it in
some meaningful way. This choice, too, may implicate serious
issues of political and social policy.
As already explained, in many instances the governmental
choice to prohibit behavior is legislatively implemented by means
of a private compensatory remedial model, which seeks simulta-
neously to compensate those who have been harmed by that be-
havior and to punish and deter the behavior by those who have
engaged in it or are considering doing so.122 Government, how-
ever, has available to it alternative means of enforcing its prohi-
bitions, especially when the effectiveness of the compensatory
remedy as a punishment or deterrent is in doubt. This situation
will arise where the transaction costs in judicially enforcing com-
pensation remedies are likely to be high, where injured victims
may lack the sophistication to bring suit, where either the exis-
tence or determination of damage is in doubt, or where the pro-
hibited behavior is deemed sufficiently culpable as to justify pun-
ishment, untied to compensation.
When this occurs, government may: (1) replace actual dam-
ages with a statutorily determined measure of damages; (2) sup-
plement actual damages with either statutorily determined pen-
alties or an authorization of the judicial award of punitive dam-
ages; (3) punish the behavior criminally; (4) authorize the imposi-
tion of civil fines; (5) create a system of administrative enforce-
ment; or (6) establish a public guardian to act on behalf of the
" See Part I.
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victims. Also, as the discussion of qui tam actions shows,'23 in rare
cases government has employed a "bounty hunter" model, by pro-
viding a non-compensatory reward to private individuals to en-
courage them to assist in enforcing legal regulation of behavior
deemed harmful to the public interest.
It is conceivable that different methods of enforcement would
give rise to different reactions from the electorate. A private com-
pensatory remedy may have the greatest appeal because it has a
two-fold purpose: to compensate injured victims and to deter
unlawful behavior. At the other end of the scale, the electorate
may be more suspicious of a bounty hunter remedy, because it
places the enforcement of public policy in the hands of individuals
who are neither representative of nor accountable to the elector-
ate and who are likely motivated primarily, if not exclusively, by
considerations of personal gain. Thus, the legislative selection of
a remedial model is potentially of great political significance.
B. The Foundations of Democracy
My argument, it should be recalled, is that class action suits
brought on behalf of what is, for all practical purposes, a non-
existent class amount to the use of a bounty hunter model, rather
than the private compensatory remedial scheme provided for in
the law being enforced in the class action. In this sense, the ar-
gument proceeds, the procedure has transformed the essence of
that substantive law.'24 To this point, however, a key question
about the natureand force of this argument remains largely un-
answered: exactly how does this process of transformation un-
dermine fundamental notions of democratic theory? To answer
that question, I need first to posit a basic structural framework of
democratic theory. To be sure, political theorists have argued
endlessly about the structural and normative contours of democ-
ratic theory. Hence in shaping abstract precepts of democratic
theory it will be necessary to bring democracy down to its lowest
common denominators-elements that without which, virtually
all would agree, the concept of democracy is rendered meaning-
less at best and Orwellian at worst. I must then explain how the
modern class action's transformation of the pre-existing remedial
model contravenes those precepts. In addition, it is appropriate to
explore whether the problems to which I point do nothing more
See text accompanying note 26.
See Part III.
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than raise normative issues of political theory, or whether they
also give rise to statutory and/or constitutional violations.
1. Democracy as representation and accountability.
Any attempt to discern foundational precepts of democracy
should start with the concession that democratic theorists have
generally agreed on relatively little. Debates between individual
autonomy theorists on the one hand and civic republicans and
communitarians on the other continue to rage.125 The views of
theorists who believe that democracy flourishes when members of
the community are encouraged to participate as much as possible
in governmental decisionmaking differ substantially from those
of scholars who believe the electorate's role in the political proc-
ess should be severely restricted. 26
All scholars who express a foundational belief in democracy,
however, must agree on at least one key point. In the words of
constitutional and political theorist Alexander Meiklejohn, the
ultimate normative premise of democratic theory is that
"[glovernments . . .derive their just powers from the consent of
the governed. If that consent be lacking, governments have no
just powers." 27 It is certainly true that the American governmen-
tal system is far from a pure democracy, grounded exclusively on
the value of popular sovereignty. Our society also has a counter-
majoritarian constitutional system, which imposes significant
limitations on popular sovereignty, both procedurally and sub-
stantively. Concern about the unpredictability and danger of de-
cision-making by uncontrolled masses played an important role
in the minds of those who shaped the American Constitution. 8
' See sources cited in notes 53-55.
Compare Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (California 1984) (favoring heavy
involvement of the citizenry in the democratic process) with Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capi-
talism, Socialism, and Democracy (Harper 1942) (urging an extremely limited role for the
electorate in the democratic process).
" Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 9 (Harper 1960). See also Henry Mayo, An
Introduction to Democratic Theory 103 (Oxford 1960) ("[Elverything necessary to [democ-
ratic] theory may be put in terms of (a) legislators (or decision-makers) who are (b) legiti-
mated or authorized to enact public policies, and who are (c) subject or responsible to
popular control at free elections."); J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory 310
(Princeton 1979) ("Elections are thought to constitute the great sanction for assuring
representative behavior, by showing what the voters consider to be their interests by
giving them the incentive to pursue those objectives.").
" See Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 Colum L Rev 111, 128 (2003)
("Despite their rhetorical commitment to 'popular sovereignty,' by the time the Constitu-
tion was written its framers were pretty well convinced that pure majority rule or democ-
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Thus, the President is elected, not directly by the people but by
an intermediary body.129 For many years, United States Senators
were elected, not by the people but by the state legislatures. ' °
Federal legislation is promulgated by means of a complex process
that requires the assent of both houses of Congress and, usually,
acceptance by the President.13 1 It is thus possible, if not likely,
that much legislation favored by a majority of the electorate will
not be enacted. 112 But all that these facts demonstrate is that ma-
joritarianism, in a technical sense, is not the focal point of Ameri-
can constitutional democracy. It surely does not follow that the
normative foundations of the nation's political structure are free
of any commitment to the notion of ultimate sovereignty in the
people. Indeed, a system lacking such a foundational commitment
would, as a definitional matter, amount to an authoritarian state,
which is anathema to a society that from its inception rejected
the notion of taxation without representation. ' Even democratic
theorists who lack general respect for the intelligence or abilities
of the electorate, such as Joseph Schumpeter, believe that, in a
democracy, "the people have the opportunity of accepting or refus-
ing the men who are to rule them."3 4
racy was a bad idea."); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Mak-
ing of the Constitution 203-43 (Vintage 1997).
' US Const Art II, § 1, cl 2; Amend XII (establishing the manner in which the elec-
toral college representatives will be selected and the procedure that the electors will use to
elect the President).
'3' US Const Art I, § 3, cl 1. This process of Senatorial election was subsequently
changed to a direct electoral process by amendment. See US Const Amend XVII.
131 See US Const Art I, § 7, cls 2, 3 (presentment clauses); Art I, §§ 1 and 7, cl 2 (bicam-
eralism requirement). See also INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) (holding that a federal
immigration statute allowing the House to overrule the Attorney General on deportation
decision failed to meet the constitutional requirements for legislative actions of bicameral-
ism and presentment).
'32 See Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95
Nw U L Rev 845, 847-48, 854-71 (2001) (emphasizing that separation of powers and
interest group power complicate the majoritatian assumption).
... See James A. Morone, The Democratic Wish 33 (Yale 2d ed 1998) ("Americans broke
from England expressing a democratic wish."). See also id at 39 ("When Parliament im-
posed taxes on the colonies.., the Americans charged that their own assemblies had not
approved the levies-taxation without representation.").
" Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy at 285 (cited in note 126). See
also id at 246 (proposing "government approved by the people"); id at 285 (suggesting that
a criterion for "identifying the democratic method" is "competition among would-be leaders
for the vote of the electorate"). According to democratic theorist Peter Bachrach, Schum-
peter thought "it is absurd to believe that 'the people' have rational views on every issue
and that the function of their representatives is to carry out their views in the legislative
chamber." Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique 20 (University
1967). Thus, according to Schumpeter, "the people must understand that they cannot take
political action between elections. Even 'bombarding' representatives with letters and
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The keys to the form of democracy adopted in the United
States, then, are not principles of majoritarianism, but rather-at
least for policy choices not controlled by the counter-majoritarian
Constitution' 35-the axioms of representation and accountability.
In other words, those who make basic, sub-constitutional choices
of social policy must (1) have been chosen by the electorate, and
(2) be accountable to the electorate if they wish to continue in
office. Focus upon commitment to these basic principles of democ-
ratic theory at some level moots one of the primary dilemmas of
democracy. Both historically and politically, democratic theorists
have wavered between the urge to value widespread participatory
democracy-what political scientist James Morone refers to as
"the democratic wish"136 -and the simultaneous "dread of gov-
ernment."1 37 By selecting those who govern, the electorate con-
tributes to its own governing.38 At the same time, representative
government protects liberty by serving as a check on potentially
despotic leadership that has been freed from any accountability
to the people.
1 39
2. Attacks on the representation-accountability rationale.
This does not mean that modern commentators, particularly
in the legal field, have universally adopted an unquestioning
commitment to these foundational precepts of democracy, on ei-
ther normative or empirical levels.4 My colleague Robert Ben-
nett, for example, has argued that, as a practical matter, the in-
dividual's vote is invariably meaningless in choosing elected offi-
cials.' Therefore the primary value of democracy is neither "rep-
telegrams, Schumpeter argued, ought to be banned." Id at 21 (internal citation omitted).
For a rejection of a "vote-centered" model of democracy, consider Bennett, Counter-
Conversationalism (cited in note 132).
" Even the Constitution, it should be recalled, is not completely insulated from con-
trol of the people, since it is subject to amendment, albeit through resort to a complex and
difficult process. See US Const Art V.
" Morone, The Democratic Wish at 1 (cited in note 133).
131 Id at 2.
" See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 S Ct Rev
245, 255 (arguing that the electorate is the true governor, and that those selected to gov-
ern are merely agents of that true governor).
"39 See David Held, Models of Democracy 93 (Stanford 2d ed 1996) (pointing out that
Madison "conceived of the federal representative state as the key mechanism to aggregate
individuals' interests and to protect their rights").
"' For an earlier response to what I have described as "democracy bashing" by a num-
ber of modern legal scholars, see Martin H. Redish, Judge-Made Abstention and the Fash-
ionable Art of "Democracy Bashing," 40 Case Western L Rev 997 (1990).
" Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism (cited in note 132).
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resentativeness" nor accountability of elected officials. It is, in-
stead, the incidental benefits to be derived from the democratic
conversation to which the governing process gives rise. 42 But
while Professor Bennett's point about the meaninglessness of the
individual vote is no doubt accurate, the generalization of this
insight to the entire electoral process is fundamentally flawed,
because it effectively renders a benevolent dictatorship morally
indistinguishable from a democracy. Moreover, if the electoral
process itself is largely meaningless, what is the point of encour-
aging conversations about that process among members of the
electorate? Thus, it is both logically and practically impossible to
separate the developmental values of democracy from commit-
ment to the foundational principles of representation and ac-
countability.
Another attack on the representation/accountability version
of democratic theory might be that those goals cannot realisti-
cally ever be reached, because legislators vote on a multitude of
bills, not just one. Thus, it is quite possible that a citizen will
agree with her legislator's vote on one bill, but disagree on an-
other. Yet that citizen will be called upon to vote yea or nay on
that legislator's retention. Whichever way she votes on that issue,
her choice will not fully reflect her views on all of the issues that
come before the legislature. To a certain extent, the criticism is of
course accurate. It does not automatically follow, however, that
providing citizens with a vote on retention fails to achieve any of
the representational goals of democratic theory. This point is best
comprehended by contrasting the representative system, with all
of its imperfections, to an authoritarian state. In an authoritarian
state, the citizens have absolutely no say in the choice of govern-
mental decision-makers. In contrast, under a representative sys-
tem at least the citizens may make their choices by consideration
of the candidates' positions or votes on the issue or issues he
deems of primary importance.
Modern civic republican theorists, such as Cass Sunstein,
have urged acceptance of a political theory that seems at odds, on
fundamental levels, with the basic tenets of democracy.14 Sun-
stein has suggested that, in the pursuit of "the common good,"
society should be guided, at least in part, by a principle of "uni-
versalism" that posits the possibility of "substantively right an-
'' Id at 871-76.
Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1541 (cited in note 51) (describing the four central princi-
ples of liberal republicanism).
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swers." ' But it is unclear who, exactly, gets to determine the
content of these "substantively right answers." In any event, such
reasoning is fundamentally inconsistent with the substantive
epistemological humility inherent in any commitment to a de-
mocratic system: a society that values democracy only to the ex-
tent that it reaches externally derived, predetermined normative
conclusions is no more a democracy than Iran was under the Aya-
tollah Khomeini or the Eastern European Communist states were
during the Cold War period. Thus, to the extent modern civic re-
publicans posit the existence of a "good," derived by means exter-
nal to the will of the populace, that is to legally bind society, they
are rejecting democracy, rather than defining it.
Certainly, there exist almost countless permutations and
combinations of democratic systems from which a society could
choose in deciding how to govern itself. It is appropriate to con-
clude, however, that if history and language are to mean any-
thing, a society cannot be considered "democratic" in any mean-
ingful sense unless the bulk of sub-constitutional policy choices
are made, directly or indirectly, by those who are representative
of and accountable to the electorate.
C. The Political Commitment Principle As a Logical Outgrowth
of Democracy
If one accepts the principles of representation and account-
ability as the foundations of democracy, it logically follows that
laws enacted by the electorate's representatives ought not be kept
secret. Nor would it logically be possible for legislators to vote by
secret ballot. There is little point in allowing the public both to
choose and retain its governing representatives, if the public is
unaware of how those representatives voted on legislation, both
proposed and enacted. Moreover, it would be even more harmful
to democratic interests were government to purport to adopt
"Law A" while secretly enacting "Law B" or "Law Not A." At least
when legislators' votes on legislation are kept secret, the public is
on notice to pursue alternative avenues of assuring itself of the
political views of its chosen representatives. When legislators
' Id at 1554. See also Sunstein, 38 Stan L Rev at 31-32 (cited in note 54) (positing
that "through discussion people can, in their capacities as citizens, escape private inter-
ests and engage in pursuit of the public good .... [Tihis conception reflects a belief that
debate and discussion help to reveal that some values are superior to others. Denying that
decisions about values are merely matters of taste, the republican view assumes that
'practical reason' can be used to settle social issues.").
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publicly proclaim their support (or opposition) to "Law A," but in
reality the legislature has enacted a different or contrary law, the
public has been effectively defrauded. Indeed, it is difficult to dis-
tinguish such political fraud from a candidate's obtaining money
from union workers on the basis of the false assertion that he has
actively participated in union activities. Such deceptive lawmak-
ing is far more harmful to democracy than secretive legislation-
as problematic as such legislation is-because in such a situation
the public is deceived into believing that democracy is actually
working.
It is true that as a practical matter, much modern law is
made by government officials not directly accountable to the
populace. Courts, whose judges-at least at the federal level-do
not stand for election, on occasion fashion common-law principles,
and administrative agencies, in applying legislation, have tradi-
tionally exercised enormous discretionary power. To a certain
extent, from the perspective of democratic theory, both assertions
of power may well be deemed problematic, for the very reason
that those making the decisions do not satisfy the requirements
of representation and accountability.' Neither situation, how-
ever, is as systemically invidious as the process whereby govern-
ing law is surreptitiously transformed into a different or contrary
law. In the context of judicial lawmaking, presumably the repre-
sentative agencies of government have either failed or refused to
act on the issue at hand, and a court must fill that vacuum, if
only to perform its function within the private rights adjudicatory
model: the court must determine governing law, simply to deter-
mine who wins. The existence of administrative decision-making,
in contrast, effectively concedes that generally framed legislation
cannot possibly anticipate every conceivable application. There-
fore, someone must intercede to perform that function. Moreover,
administrative agencies can be considered indirectly account-
able-at least to the extent they are considered part of the execu-
tive branch. Finally, to the extent legislators cede to administra-
tive agencies fundamental lawmaking power, it is arguable that
an electorate unhappy with such open-ended delegation may hold
those legislators accountable at the next election.' None of these
". For a more detailed discussion of this view, see Redish, The Constitution as Politi-
cal Structure at 135-61 (cited in note 9).
"' See Mashaw, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 87 (cited in note 9) (finding "it difficult to un-
derstand why we do not presently have exactly the 'clowns ... we deserve.' The dynamics
of accountability apparently involve voters willing to vote upon the basis of their represen-
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arguably ameliorating factors exists in the context of the surrep-
titious transformation of governing legislation.
The response might be fashioned that as a general matter,
the public is likely to be unaware of and uninterested in either
the content or structure of substantive law or the lawmaking
process. A majority of the public, the argument proceeds, gener-
ally cannot tell the difference between "Law A" and "Law Not A,"
and therefore little of practical import turns on the openness and
candor of the legislative process. In many instances, this asser-
tion would no doubt be accurate. But it most certainly will not be
true in all instances. Many segments of the public become ener-
gized by one type of law or another, from abortion regulation to
welfare standards to international trade policy, to name only a
few. 47 Once this point is conceded, however, it becomes impossi-
ble to determine, ex ante, which laws will, in fact, engender pub-
lic interest and concern, and which will not. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to proceed on a general assumption that in order for de-
mocracy to function properly, we should presume that all laws
stimulate public interest.
One might further argue that it is common knowledge that
most laws do not actually mean what they purport to say, be-
cause in reality most laws are the outgrowth of a cynical process
of bartering among competing special interests-a fact that no
legislator is likely to want to make public. This argument basi-
cally encapsulates the essence of the argument fashioned by
"public choice" theorists.'48 But whatever the truth of this asser-
tion as a matter of legislative process, it is misplaced in the pre-
sent context. The laws to which public choice theorists refer ac-
complish just what they claim to. At most, what is kept secret is
the true motivation for enactment of the law and how specific
special interests will benefit as a result of its adoption. This is by
no means the same thing as enacting a law that in reality effects
changes diametrically opposed to the results that that law pur-
ports to bring about.
tative's record in the legislature. Assuming that our current representatives in the legisla-
ture vote for laws that contain vague delegations of authority, we are presumably holding
them accountable for that at the polls. How is it that we are not being represented?").
'4 For the application of this point specifically to the context of class actions and the
surreptitious adoption of a bounty hunter remedial model, see Part III D.
"' Consider Abner J. Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Foreword, 74
Va L Rev 167 (1988); Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 Pub Int 80
(1987).
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D. Applying the Political Commitment Principle to the Modern
Class Action
All too often, the class action device has been viewed as
something other than what it was created to be-"a practical rule
of joinder where joinder was otherwise impractical."149 For exam-
ple, George Priest suggests that "there has been little effort to
explain why class litigation should be made to resemble individ-
ual litigation beyond the fact that individual litigation is re-
garded as the norm and class litigation, the exception."'5 ° The in-
dividual litigation ideal, thus, appears to be "little more than
preference for the known and accepted status quo.. 5 Professor
Priest's argument effectively views the class action in a political
and constitutional vacuum. He thereby completely ignores the
political framework within which the class action device is in-
tended to operate. Priest totally disregards the vitally important
fact that the class action was created as-and to this day, pur-
ports to be-nothing more than a procedural mechanism by
which to enforce pre-existing substantive rights. Yet substantive
law generally establishes only individual compensatory rights.
None of the statutes enforced by the class action rule distin-
guishes between individual and class rights. Indeed, all that they
create are individual rights-the very rights that are aggregated
for purposes of a class action. The class action rule, of course, cre-
ates no rights of its own. To view class litigation as something
fundamentally different from the aggregation of the individual
rights created by substantive law, then, would allow the proce-
dural rule to transform the essence of the substantive law it was
designed to enforce. The reason that the class action is modeled
on the basis of the individual litigation model is not, as Professor
Priest suggests, simply adherence to the "status quo."'52 The basis
for the intertwining of the class action and the individual litiga-
tion model is, rather, the democratic need to prevent avowedly
procedural devices from surreptitiously altering the essence of
substantive law that has been enacted by those selected by and
accountable to the electorate. So furtive an amendment process
undermines the electorate's ability to exercise the fundamental
,, Levi, Memorandum to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee at 2 (cited in note 5).
Priest, 26 J Legal Stud at 525 (cited in note 5).
' ' Id.
'' Id.
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democratic function of selecting its governmental representatives
on the basis of their legislative choices.
It might be suggested that even if my view of the modern
class action is assumed to be correct, the foundational precepts of
democracy are not significantly impacted by the subtle shift from
private compensatory remedial model to bounty hunter remedial
model. The public has neither the sophistication nor interest to
comprehend this shift, and therefore could not reasonably be ex-
pected to judge its elected representatives on the basis of their
views or votes on the question. I seriously doubt the accuracy of
this perception of the public's attitude. For example, the lack of
public understanding of all of the nuances of the recent corporate
accounting scandals did not prevent a public outcry over the mat-
ter and the scurrying of politicians to curry favor with the elec-
torate on the issue. Similarly, it would defy reality to suggest that
issues of tort reform have not appeared high on the nation's po-
litical agenda in recent years.'53 Moreover, public attitudes about
plaintiffs' class action lawyers have often been strongly negative
over that same period.'54 Indeed, at times attitudes among some
sectors of the populace toward trial lawyers have been so nega-
tive that candidates vying for political office have sought to bene-
fit from an opponent's affiliation with plaintiffs' lawyers.' Addi-
153 See, for example, Michael Allen and Amy Goldstein, Bush Urges Malpractice Dam-
age Limits; Plan Includes Goals Sought by Business, Wash Post A4 (July 26, 2002).
1" See Hensler, et al, Class Actions Dilemmas, at 21 (cited in note 21) ("The 'aroma of
gross profiteering' that many perceive rising from damage class actions troubles even
those who support continuance of damage class actions and fuels the controversy over
them."). See also Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 724 (cited in note 8) ("[Tihe plaintiffs attorney
in class and derivative actions has long been a controversial figure."). A Third Circuit task
force recently noted that "there is a perception among a significant part of the non-lawyer
population and even among lawyers and judges... that class action plaintiffs' lawyers are
overcompensated for the work they do." Chief Judge Edward R. Becker, Third Circuit
Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 74 Temple L Rev 689, 692 (2001). For an
example from the popular press, see Mauk, Lawsuit Abuse, Charleston Gazette at 5A
(cited in note 86).
"' See Nicholas Lemann, The Newcomer: Senator John Edwards is this season's De-
mocratic rising star, New Yorker 58, 82 (May 6, 2002) ("Within the Republican Party, it is
axiomatic that trial lawyers are bad guys. The idea is that the old, unsavory ambulance-
chaser type has now figured out how to get really rich, in a way that drives businesses into
bankruptcy and makes worthwhile activities uninsurable. Talk to Republicans in politics,
and you'll get a lurid picture of top trial lawyers riding around in private planes and giv-
ing lots of money to Democratic politicians, in order to insure that there won't be any
legislative limits placed on their sky-high damage awards .... It would therefore be natural
for Republicans to assume that the way to beat [North Carolina Senator] John Edwards is
simply to point out that he is a trial lawyer."). See also Morton Kondracke, Trial Lawyers
As a Political Issue, San Diego Union & Trib G2 (July 28, 2002) ("Democrats often accuse
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tionally, the judiciary itself has, on more than one occasion, ex-
pressed disdain for plaintiff class action attorneys.
15 6
It should be kept in mind that all of these criticisms have
been made while plaintiffs' attorneys were operating under the
rubric of what purports to be a private compensatory damage
class action framework. While many have pointed critically to the
willingness of plaintiff class attorneys "to subordinate the inter-
ests of class members to the attorney's own economic self-
interest,"'57 the public may temper this negative view with its as-
sumption that at the very least, these individuals are serving a
valuable public function by facilitating the compensation of vic-
tims injured by corporate wrongdoing. Full public recognition of
the fact that, in numerous class actions today, (1) injured victims
are usually unaware that suit has been brought on their behalf;
(2) plaintiffs generally receive no meaningful compensation as a
result of the suit; and (3) the only ones meaningfully rewarded for
the judicial punishment of corporate misdeeds are those very
same plaintiffs' attorneys who are so widely disdained and mis-
trusted, may lead to widespread public outrage.
The response might be made that the public is, in fact, al-
ready aware of this information. After all, criticism of modern
class actions on the grounds that "class action attorneys are the
prime beneficiaries" of damage class actions... is already wide-
spread. Thus, public outrage should not be expected to increase
were the legal reality to be transformed into formal legal rule.
But it is dangerous to assume general public understanding of
this issue. The class actions in question are, at least superficially,
brought to enforce private compensatory rights established by
pre-existing substantive law, and injured victims are often pa-
raded as part of the suits. At the very least, then, the existing
legal framework likely gives rise to substantial public confusion
on the matter. One might further respond that reliance on de-
mocratic principles as a basis for criticizing modern class actions
Republicans of being the 'party of special interests' but the Democrats rarely get tagged as
'the party of trial lawyers,' which they are.").
" See, for example, Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 670 n 3 (cited in note 8) (noting "the
frequency with which judicial opinions favoring new restrictions on the availability of
class actions or other remedies criticize the plaintiffs attorney").
... John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loy-
alty in Representative Litigation, 100 Colum L Rev 370, 371-72 (2000) (internal citation
omitted). Professor Coffee further notes the "standard depiction [of the plaintiff class
attorney] as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of opportunistic actions." Id.
,"' Hensler, et al, Class Action Dilemmas at 21 (cited in note 21).
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makes little sense when many of the substantive laws being
transformed, such as the antitrust laws, were enacted long before
any current citizens were even alive and by legislators who have
long passed from the scene. But many of the substantive laws
invoked in modern class actions, such as consumer protection or
environmental protection, are of much more recent vintage.
In any event, such a response misses the fundamental point
because it ignores the manner in which Rule 23 shifts the sub-
stantive inertia. Imagine, for example, proposed federal legisla-
tion expressly authorizing qui tam-like suits by plaintiff class
action attorneys that reward them for bringing corporate wrong-
doers to justice, sans victims or compensatory damages. It is diffi-
cult to believe that, given the already skeptical attitude that per-
vades the public view of plaintiff class action attorneys, the pro-
posal of such legislation would fail to engenderwidespread public
debate, if not outrage. At the very least, no one could reasonably
predict that this would not be the result. Yet, if my description of
current class action structure and practice is largely accurate,
that description is very close to the current situation-although
the public may not be aware of it, due to the superficial adher-
ence to the traditional framework. Thus, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the current class action framework has serious impli-
cations for the foundational democratic principles of representa-
tion and accountability.
Conceivably, one could challenge my application of the politi-
cal commitment principle to class actions on the grounds that it
proves far more than I am suggesting. According to the political
commitment principle, one could reasonably challenge all of the
federal rules of procedure or evidence promulgated under the
Rules Enabling Act on the grounds that they circumvent the de-
mocratic process. Vesting the rulemaking power in the Supreme
Court, then, should logically be deemed an improper delegation of
legislative power. Quite frankly, as a purely theoretical matter,
such a non-delegation argument may indeed be persuasive. 59 But
one need not reach that conclusion in order to condemn the struc-
ture and practice of the modern class action on grounds of democ-
ratic theory. As a general matter, the Rules of Civil Procedure
deal with issues of overwhelmingly procedural concern, whose
impact on the shaping of substantive rights is at most indirect
. See Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure at 131-65 (cited in note 9) (urg-
ing a far more restrictive non-delegation doctrine than the post-New Deal Supreme Court
has employed).
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and incidental. My argument is that this is far from the case with
the modern class action. A rule, promulgated by an unrepresenta-
tive and unaccountable body such as the Supreme Court 60 that
effectively transforms an essential element of the underlying sub-
stantive law is, I submit, on an entirely different level.
E. The Constitutional and Statutory Implications of the
Democratic Difficulty
To this point, the analysis has focused largely on the implica-
tions of political theory for the structure and operation of the
modern class action. It is reasonable to ask, however, whether
these considerations of political theory, in turn, have significant
implications for issues of constitutional or statutory interpreta-
tion. Put in the most concrete terms, one should ask whether the
criticisms of the class action that I have made logically lead not
only to a need for substantial revision of Rule 23, but also to the
judicial invalidation of the Rule or its operation on statutory or
constitutional grounds, regardless of any action taken by the Ad-
visory Committee. It may well be possible to fashion arguable
constitutional and statutory critiques of modern class action op-
eration. Ultimately, however, it is likely that neither legal basis
would support judicial invalidation of any part of Rule 23, for
both practical and conceptual reasons.
It is nevertheless a helpful exercise to explore the potential
statutory and constitutional concerns to which the operation of
Rule 23 gives rise, in order to augment the uneasiness that one
should already be feeling about the modern class action in light of
the democratic concerns previously discussed. Taken as a whole,
these concerns probably do not justify the extreme remedy of ju-
dicial invalidation. Nevertheless, relevant statutory and constitu-
tional concerns come sufficiently close as to underscore and aug-
ment the purely normative problems of democratic process to
which the modern class action gives rise. Consideration of statu-
tory and constitutional issues therefore dictates the need for sub-
stantial revision of the Rule, in order to prevent-or at least re-
duce-these legal and theoretical dangers.
" It is true, of course, that Congress possesses the legislative power to overrule indi-
vidual Federal Rules, see 28 USC § 2072, so its failure to do so could arguably be taken to
represent legislative approval. But such a "legislation-by-inaction" method most assuredly
fails to satisfy the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements for the
enactment of legislation. See INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 946-51 (1983).
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1. Statutory implications.
On a statutory level, the argument that a procedural rule
substantially alters pre-existing substantive law would seem to
suggest that such a rule violates the Rules Enabling Act's direc-
tive that a Federal Rule not "abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right."'61 It is certainly true that, as Geoffrey Hazard has
argued, "the function of procedure would be unintelligible if it
were not to have substantive consequences."162 Thus, the fact that
use of the class action device-or any other joinder device, for
that matter-accelerates or facilitates the enforcement of sub-
stantive law, thereby enabling that law to have a more significant
substantive impact than it would otherwise have had, cannot
automatically render a Federal Rule a violation of the Rules Ena-
bling Act, if the Rules are to have any coherence or meaning. The
question, however, should be, as the Supreme Court asked in
Burlington Northern Railroad Co v Woods, 3 whether the rule
only "incidentally affect[s] litigants' substantive rights" and is
"reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of [the] system of
rules."'64 If the Rules Enabling Act's directive is not to be ren-
dered meaningless, where the rule has been structured specifi-
cally for the purpose of altering pre-existing substantive law, the
Act's prohibition on alteration of substantive rights must be
deemed violated.
65
1 28 USC § 2072(b).
Geoffrey B. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive
Law, in Class Actions: Excerpts from a Symposium before the Judicial Conference of the
Fifth Judicial Circuit, 58 FRD 299, 307-12 (1973).
6 480 US 1 (1987).
6 Id at 5.
The argument could be made that as long as the rule deals in some way with the
fairness and/or efficiency of the truth-finding process, it is appropriately characterized as
purely "procedural" and therefore not in violation of the Act's directive. See Sibbach v
Wilson & Co, 312 US 1, 10-11 (1941) (noting that a litigant's concession that Rule 35(a),
concerning mental and physical examinations as part of discovery process, affects proce-
dure destroys the argument that the rule abridges substantive rights in violation of the
Rules Enabling Act). This "mutual exclusivity" approach to the substance-procedure dis-
tinction was, in fact, adopted by the Supreme Court in Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460
(1965), as the basis for defining the scope of Congress's constitutional power to establish
the procedures employed in federal court. Id at 472-74 (holding that service of process
under Rule 4(d)(1) is constitutional because, though it may fall within an uncertain area
between substance and procedure, Congress has the constitutional power to make rules
governing court practices that are at least arguably procedural). But the Rules Enabling
Act's directive has generally been construed to impose a more stringent limitation on the
rulemaking power. See, for example, Burlington Northern, 480 US at 5 (1987).
Note that, under the "incidental" standard of Burlington Northern, the fact that a
rule consciously alters the case's outcome does not automatically render the rule an inva-
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From one perspective, Rule 23's use of an opt-out procedure
arguably satisfies the Rules Enabling Act's directive, since it is
obviously concerned with the procedure by which the class action
is initiated. But in light of the critique fashioned here,'66 there can
be little question that the rule's choice of opt-out was heavily in-
fluenced by the way it affects individually-granted substantive
rights enforced under the private rights model. As a result of that
process, individuals in whom private rights have been substan-
tively vested bring suit, no doubt often without any awareness
that they are doing so. Is that dramatic impact on substantive
law properly classified as "incidental"? I suppose that at first
glance one might argue that this is so-as long as the opt-out pro-
cedure is viewed in a vacuum, rather than as one element in an
organic process that transforms a compensatory remedial model
into a bounty hunter model. Even from this myopic perspective,
however, reference to the Advisory Committee reporter's own
words suggest that the procedure's impact on substantive rights
was far from incidental. Professor Benjamin Kaplan wrote at the
time of Rule 23's adoption that opt-out was part of a broader plan
to employ the class action as a type of administrative guardian,
rather than simply as a means to facilitate, through use of an
aggregative process, pre-existing individual compensatory rights.'67
It is nevertheless extremely difficult to predict a successful
Enabling Act attack on the opt-out provision of Rule 23, for sev-
eral reasons. Initially, any such attack on a federal rule faces a
significant uphill battle, because of the Supreme Court's strong
presumption in favor of the Rules' validity under the Enabling
Act. The Court has indicated that "the study and approval given
each proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Con-
ference, and this Court. .. give the Rules presumptive validity
under both the constitutional and statutory constraints."6 ' Sec-
lid modification of substantive rights. As long as the rule is designed primarily to affect
the fairness or efficiency of the adjudicatory process, the fact that it employs the threat of
dismissal or a variant of res judicata as a club by which to enforce its procedural directive
does not necessarily mean that it abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive right.
... See Part II A.
167 Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 394-98 (cited in note 111); See also text accompanying
notes 112-13.
"6 Burlington Northern, 480 US at 6 (1987). But see Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Sub-
stantive Rights" (In the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 Notre Dame L Rev 47, 100
(1998) ("It is equally unrealistic to assume that the Court, in transmitting proposed Rule
amendments to Congress, has made a determination that the Rules are valid."). See also
id at 48-49 (noting that while "the Court has never found a Rule invalid for impermissibly
affecting a substantive right," it is also true that "[in several recent cases, the Court has
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ondly, at least when the opt-out provision is viewed in a vacuum,
it is difficult to deny its significant impact on the process of class
organization-an unambiguously procedural matter.
Even less vulnerable to a Rules Enabling Act attack is the
second of the ominous bookends of the modern class action: the
settlement or adjudication of a class action suit in which class
members effectively receive no relief. The obvious problem is that
such a result is nowhere dictated by the explicit text of Rule 23.
Indeed, it is certainly possible, under Rule 23 as currently writ-
ten, to conduct a class suit that satisfies all of the requirements of
the private compensatory remedial model contemplated in the
underlying substantive law. This category would include any suit
in which (1) meaningful and useful relief is made available to
class members, and (2) it is realistic to believe that class mem-
bers will receive that compensation. Thus, there is nothing ex-
plicit in Rule 23 that could be directly challenged under the Rules
Enabling Act. In effect, one would be seeking to challenge the
Rule 23's failure to preclude class actions that did not fall in this
legitimate category. It is therefore difficult to imagine how a
Rules Enabling Act challenge would even be framed in this con-
text.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the concerns
manifested in the Rules Enabling Act should have no influence on
those charged with the duty to consider revisions of the Rules.
Though traditionally the Rules Enabling Act's directive on sub-
stantive rights had its primary impact on cases involving federal
enforcement of state substantive rights,69 in recent years scholars
have adopted the position "that in granting a limited power to
promulgate rules, Congress was concerned more about protecting
its own prerogatives as an elected national legislature than about
the danger that the rules would run afoul of the powers of the
states as expressed in the Rules of Decision Act."7 ° As Professor
Shapiro has correctly noted, "procedure," as used in the Rules
signaled its willingness to take the substantive rights limitation seriously, treating it as a
rule of construction in reading Rules narrowly, so as not to overstep the bounds of the
Court's rulemaking authority") (internal citations omitted). It does not appear that such
willingness on the part of the Court could have any relevance to the opt-out procedure,
however, since that provision does not lend itself to narrowing interpretation. But see
Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 612-13 (1997) (noting that Rule 23 must be
interpreted in conjunction with the Rules Enabling Act).
See, for example, Burlington Northern, 480 US 1; Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460.
170 Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev 913 at 952 (internal citation omitted) (cited in note
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Enabling Act, performs the "subordinate role" of "acting as the
means of determining substantive rights and liabilities."171 The
Rules Enabling Act's restriction of the Rules to procedural mat-
ters, then, surely does not authorize a rule that both permits and
condones the creation of a form of litigation that completely
transforms the remedial model established in the underlying
substantive law.
2. Constitutional implications.
The constitutional inquiry considers the situation on the as-
sumption that Congress intended to delegate to the rule makers,
as part of their grant to promulgate rules of procedure, the au-
thority to promulgate rules designed to modify pre-existing sub-
stantive remedies. Such an examination is purely hypothetical,
since Congress in the Rules Enabling Act quite clearly chose to
retain exclusive authority to alter pre-existing substantive law.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to conduct an inquiry into the con-
stitutional implications of the theoretical critique, because it
helps to demonstrate the stark inconsistency of modern class ac-
tion procedure with our constitutional tradition.
Though in important respects the situation is not identical to
the present one under consideration, it is interesting to note that,
under established separation of powers doctrine, Congress may
not require the Article III federal courts to enforce a procedural
or evidentiary rule that alters pre-existing substantive law,
unless Congress itself simultaneously alters that substantive
law.'72 Though Congress possesses broad power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the federal courts,' it may not require those courts
to act in an unconstitutional manner.'74 To require the federal
Id at 929 (emphasis in original).
172 In Seattle Audubon Society v Robertson, 914 F2d 1311 (9th Cir 1990), revd on other
grounds, 503 US 429 (1992), for example, the Ninth Circuit invalidated federal legislation
that created an evidentiary presumption that, the court believed, had the impact of trans-
forming the pre-existing substantive law. The Supreme Court reversed because it dis-
agreed with the lower court's conclusion that Congress had not directly transformed the
relevant substantive law. 503 US at 538. However, the Supreme Court did not reject the
Ninth Circuit's statement of general legal principles. Id.
"' See, for example, John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U Chi L Rev 203, 204 (1997) (commenting
that the language of Article III of the Constitution supports the traditional view that
Congress's authority over federal court jurisdiction is substantial).
"' See, for example, United States v Klein, 80 US (13 Wall) 128, 145-47 (1871) (ac-
knowledging congressional power to limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, but
holding that the power does not extend to congressional vesting of jurisdiction in a man-
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courts to enforce a procedural rule that effectively transforms the
governing substantive law would make the federal courts com-
plicit in the commission of a fraud on the electorate, and thereby
undermine the courts' integrity.17 1
In the class action context, of course, it is not Congress that
has required the federal courts to enforce a procedural rule facili-
tating the transformation of otherwise unchanged substantive
law. Rather, the Supreme Court itself has promulgated such a
rule. Hence, in this context, the concern over preservation of the
separation of powers protections of federal judicial integrity is
naturally rendered irrelevant.'76 But it is important to recognize
the manner in which the two situations do overlap: in both, a rule
that is expressly labeled procedural effectively transforms the
essence of substantive law. After all, it is the essentially anti-
democratic nature of the sub rosa transformation that renders
such a congressional directive to the courts a threat to judicial
integrity in the first place. When the manipulation comes, not
from the representative body but from the unrepresentative
agent, in a certain sense the threat to democracy actually in-
creases.
F. Pragmatism, Class Actions, and the Democratic Difficulty
In criticizing the modern class action as a circumvention of
the democratic process, I have attempted to link a hard dose of
pragmatism to a considerably more abstract analysis, grounded
in political theory. I have focused on pragmatic considerations,
looking behind technicalities and appearances and determining
whether or not a real class exists by assessing practical realities.
ner that limits the Court's decision making independence). See also Henry Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
Harv L Rev 1362, 1372-73 (1953) (noting that "the difficulty involved in asserting anyjudicial control in the face of a total denial of jurisdiction doesn't exist if Congress givesjurisdiction but puts strings on it," and arguing that "if Congress directs an Article III
court to decide a case," the court could "easily read into Article III a limitation on the
power of Congress to tell the court how to decide it") (emphasis in original).
" See Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 Mercer L Rev 697, 714-15 (1995) (arguing that separation of powers pre-
vents legislative branch from manipulating legislative ends through judicial process).
.7 In addition to separation of powers, one might also argue that due process guaran-
tees a defendant's right to be judged under the substantive law as it exists at the time of
suit. See Martin H. Redish, Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort
Litigation, 63 Def Couns J 18, 22 (1996) ("Procedural due process assures that substantive
laws enacted by representatives of the electorate and accountable to it are properly en-
forced."). However, detailed examination of this constitutional argument is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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I have also focused on issues of abstract political theory, by con-
demning class actions on the grounds that they often circumvent
the democratic process. I have developed this theoretical critique,
however, without regard either to the impact of my analysis on
the viability of the modem class action or to the arguably positive
social benefits performed by the modern class action. Both as-
pects of my approach arguably leave me vulnerable to attack.
1. Class actions, political theory, and social consequences.
If one accepts my argument that all too often the modem
class action contravenes fundamental precepts of democracy and
therefore needs to be restructured in order to prevent that result,
there can be little question that the class action as we have come
to know it in recent years could not survive. To be sure, the class
action procedure, properly structured, could remain an extremely
important joinder device. But it would be disingenuous to suggest
that, under this revised structure, class action lawyers would
have nearly the same incentives to act that they presently have.
Those who favor class actions as they currently exist would no
doubt argue that this result is socially and politically unaccept-
able. Injured victims would be denied an effective procedural
means of gaining compensation, and an important deterrent to
corporate wrongdoing would be lost.
Such an argument is seriously flawed, on both empirical and
conceptual grounds. Initially, it ignores much of the point of my
critique: with its current structure, the class action too often fails
to provide meaningful compensation to injured victims. It is true
that this failure does not alter the use of class actions as a deter-
rent to illegal corporate behavior. But the exclusive focus of class
action defenders on the procedure's deterrence value is itself mis-
guided. Initially, it suffers from what I describe as "the fallacy of
the free-standing class action." Scholars who would make such an
argument operate under the fallacious assumption that the class
action procedure itself provides a free-standing check on corpo-
rate illegality. As already noted, however, it is the underlying
substantive law, rather than a procedural rule, that establishes
both the standards of corporate illegality and the means of en-
forcing those standards.177 If the class action enforces those stan-
dards by resort to a remedial model that differs from the remedial
.. See Part II.
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model adopted in the substantive law. It is no defense of the class
action to suggest that it deters illegal corporate behavior.
It may well be that in the case of many substantive restric-
tions on corporate behavior, the private compensatory remedial
model provides an ineffective means of enforcement and deter-
rence, for the simple reason that individualized damages are too
small to justify the transaction costs of even the class action pro-
cedure. An individual plaintiff's damages may be so small that
she is unwilling even to take the relatively minimal effort re-
quired either to opt in to a class at its start or to file a claim at its
close. In such cases, it is incumbent on the governing legislative
body to find alternative methods of deterring corporate illegality.
If criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement mechanisms
are deemed insufficient, the legislature may wish to consider
creation of a form of bounty hunter-private attorney general ac-
tion, despite its potential constitutional problems. But surely, a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure may not implement such a
change, if the protections inherent in the democratic process are
to function properly.
2. Pragmatism and class actions: the problem of
categorization.
It could be suggested that my pragmatic analysis simultane-
ously ignores class actions' compliance with the technical re-
quirements of the procedural rule and the reality that at least
some class members are both aware of and in agreement with the
suit and some class members actually benefit, on an individual
basis, from the award. For example, in a class action that has
been settled in exchange for defendant's agreement to make dis-
count coupons available to class members, it is likely that at least
a minimal number of class members will, in fact, make use of and
benefit from the coupons they receive. In some cases, perhaps the
number will not be all that small. In other cases, a significant
number of class members may well file claim forms, despite ei-
ther the limited amount of individual damage suffered or the
burdens incurred in completing the form. In yet other cases class
members' individual claims may be satisfied without the filing of
a claim form, because individual damages are easily determin-
able and the defendant possesses business records listing all class
members. Hence, it could be argued that my critique paints with
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far too broad an empirical brush, thereby effectively destroying
real class actions in an effort to ferret out faux class actions.
The anticipated argument brings to light what could be
called the problem of categorization. Closer examination reveals
that it is in reality a combination of two distinct yet related is-
sues: the problems of both inter-class categorization and intra-
class categorization. Inter-class categorization refers to the over-
broad nature of any of the remedies I might suggest, because
those remedies are likely to sweep both real and faux class ac-
tions within their reach. Intra-class categorization, in contrast,
describes the problems caused by my willingness to classify an
entire class as faux, even where some minimal number of class
members will likely be aware of the suit and/or receive meaning-
ful compensation-for example, where a small number of class
members actually take advantage of and benefit from discount
coupons. The two concerns are linked by their emphasis on the
practical difficulty inherent in any attempt to categorize concep-
tually class actions that realistically defy such categorization.
While it is certainly reasonable to raise such concerns about my
critique, ultimately they should not present serious difficulties for
remedying the problem I have perceived in the modern class ac-
tion.
On one level, at least, the categorization concern is unre-
sponsive to my critique. To the extent one accepts my contention
that the plaintiff passivity inherent in Rule 23(b)(3)'s opt-out pro-
cedure forms an essential element in the transformation from
private compensatory model to bounty hunter model, 78 categori-
zation is rendered irrelevant: all Rule 23(b)(3) class actions fall
subject to that criticism. Even if the use of the opt-out procedure,
in and of itself, were deemed insufficient to bring about this im-
permissible transformation, the categorization criticism is over-
stated, in both the inter-class and intra-class contexts. As for the
inter-class concern, nothing in my critique logically dictates
abandonment of the class action procedure. In suits in which
class members have expressed the conscious decision to exercise
their substantive rights by participating in the class action, and
meaningful relief to those class members appears to be a realistic
possibility at the outset of the case, use of the class action proce-
"' See text accompanying notes 103-06.
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dure may well improve the efficient and effective enforcement of
substantive rights. 7 9
The intra-class concern is no more legitimate. At least since
the legal realist revolution of the early twentieth century, rarely
are legal decisions grounded in technicalities that do not reflect
social reality. At a certain point, so few class members actually
benefit from a class settlement, relative to the number that do
not so benefit, that the number should be deemed de minimis. In
these cases, especially when the passivity inherent in use of opt-
out is added to the mix, these class suits are constructively trans-
formed from the private compensatory remedial model to the
bounty hunter remedial model. One could nevertheless ask how
we are to determine, ex ante, which classes deserve this descrip-
tion. The answer, I believe, is that one need never make that de-
termination in an individual case. Rather, the goal should be to
deal with the problem in a prophylactic manner, by establishing
certification standards that will reduce the likelihood of the prob-
lem ever arising.
The pragmatic questions raised in the preceding discussion,
concerning the most effective means of avoiding the problems of
democratic theory to which the modern class action gives rise,
sets the stage for a thorough examination of specific proposals for
reform. The fact that, despite these difficulties, a realistic consti-
tutional or statutory challenge to Rule 23 is highly unlikely ren-
ders the need for revision that much more compelling.
IV. AVOIDING THE DEMOCRATIC DIFFICULTY: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE REVISION OF RULE 23
A. The Permutations of Reform
As already noted, the democratic difficulty is created by a
synthesis of the ominous bookends of the 23(b)(3) class action-its
start and its close. At its start, the inherent passivity brought
about by the use of opt-out sets the groundwork for an entirely
comatose class of plaintiffs, who have never chosen to enforce
their private rights and are even unaware that a suit has been
brought on their behalf.8 ° At its close, even a successful class ac-
tion may fail to vindicate class members' private rights by provid-
For a detailed discussion of my proposed reforms of Rule 23, see Part IV.
See text accompanying notes 88-89.
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ing meaningful compensation-a result easily predictable at the
outset of the suit, because of the inherent impossibility of trans-
lating a class-based award into concrete, individualized damage
awards to class members.' In one sense or another, both of the
bookends contribute to the ultimate transformation of the class
action from an aggregative private compensatory action into what
amounts to a pure bounty hunter action. Before one can properly
consider specific reform proposals, then, it is appropriate to ex-
amine the way to combine the reform of the two problem areas.
There appear to be four such conceivable permutations: (1)
revise neither one; (2) revise both; (3) revise only the method of
initiation; or (4) revise only the method of resolution. I have al-
ready rejected option one, for reasons that should by now be obvi-
ous. Thus, we are left to choose among the final three options. It
quite probably would be unwise to rely solely on option three.
While revising opt-out would undoubtedly do much to bring the
class action back to the private compensatory rights remedial
model expressly adopted in the governing substantive law, it
would be unwise to rely exclusively on such a mode of revision. To
alter the problematic aspects of initiation while leaving the con-
structive non-compensatory/bounty hunter remedial phase that
pervades modern damage class actions unchanged would be to
leave much of the problem unaffected. Indeed, it is the transfor-
mation at the remedial stage from private compensatory to the
bounty hunter model that gives rise to the most significant diffi-
culties of democratic theory. Thus, if one were forced to choose
between the two stages as the focus of reform, it would seem to
make sense to center attention exclusively on the resolution
phase, what I have labeled option four. Since there is no logical
reason why both ends of the litigation process could not be re-
formed, however, perhaps the best solution would be to reform
both the initiation and the resolution stages-what I have labeled
option two.
B. Initiation Reform
If one decides to protect against the democratic difficulty at
the initiation stage of a 23(b)(3) class action, the strategy would
seem to be clear: simply replace opt-out with opt-in. It is true, of
course, that such an amendment would not resolve the question
of exactly at what point in the litigation process notice must be
8' See text accompanying notes 123-24.
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sent to class members, but neither would it appear to make that
issue any more difficult than it already is. Arguably more trou-
bling are the possible implications of the democratic critique for
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions. After all, one could reasonably
argue that the very same democratic considerations that render
suspect the use of opt-out, rather than opt-in, raise questions, a
fortiori, about class actions in which class members may not even
opt out. In both situations, rights vested in the individual victim
under governing substantive law are being exercised, even when
the individual has not made the decision to exercise them. Be-
cause of this fact, it would seem to make sense to abandon the
mandatory nature of at least 23(b)(1) class actions."' If particular
substantive actions are to be deemed mandatory (subject, of
course to procedural due process limitations), it is appropriate for
that choice to be made by Congress.
Class actions brought pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) present
somewhat more complex issues, since these actions are brought
predominantly for the purpose of acquiring injunctive relief,
rather than damages. 83 Moreover, such classes are often brought
on behalf of racially or ethnically defined groups, and the idea of
individual notice and opt-in would render such classes practical
impossibilities. Perhaps a persuasive argument could be made
that such actions are therefore distinguishable from other catego-
ries of class actions. True, even injunctions may flow out of the
violation of individually held rights. However, at least in civil
rights class actions brought primarily for injunctive relief, it
might be contended that the rights are actually held by the
group, rather than the individual.
In considering the impact of the democratic critique on man-
datory 23(b)(2) classes, it is important to keep in mind the context
182 The Supreme Court has expressed uneasiness about mandatory damage class ac-
tions, though on grounds of procedural due process rather than separation of powers and
accountability. See Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US at 842-43. It is arguable that in 23(b)(1)(A) class actions, use of a due process balancing calculus adopted in Mathews v El-
dridge, 424 US 319, 334-35 (1976) (weighing the private interests that will be affected by
an official action with the Government's interest in pursuing an action to determine
whether due process has been met), could satisfy due process concerns, due to the argua-
bly compelling governmental interest in protecting parties opposing the class from irrec-
oncilable directives growing out of multiple suits. A similar argument, though probably
not as strong, could be made to justify 23(b)(1)(B) classes against a procedural due process
attack, due to the potentially negative impact on absent class members flowing from mul-
tiple suits. Neither rationale, however, is responsive to the concern grounded in considera-
tions of political accountability and representation.
' FRCP 23(b)(2).
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in which the argument is raised. Recall that I am not contending
that use of opt-out violates either statutory or constitutional limi-
tations." 4 The issue, rather, is largely one of policy, to be resolved
by the Advisory Committee. Hence it is conceivable that the
Committee, drawing a type of policy balance, could decide that
neither opt-out nor opt-in is dictated when the predominant relief
sought is injunctive, rather than in the form of damages, and
therefore leave the procedure for the initiation of 23(b)(2) classes
unchanged.
C. Resolution Reform
Reform at the resolution stage would likely be considerably
more difficult to implement than initiation reform. This is so even
though the need for resolution reform is more compelling. The
difficulty is that, unlike in the initiation context, the text of Rule
23 does not directly give rise to the democratic difficulty. The
problem, rather, is that the Rule allows particular class actions to
be resolved in a manner that gives rise to democratic concerns.
The goal in reforming the Rule, then, should be to determine an
effective means to prevent that result.
The response could be made that there is no need for reform
of Rule 23 in order to ensure against the furtive transformation of
the case into a pure bounty hunter action, because courts have
more than sufficient power under the current version of Rule 23
to prevent class actions in which the only real parties in interest
(other than the defendants) are the class attorneys. Under Rule
23(e), no settlement of a class action may be made absent a judi-
cial determination that the settlement is fair.'85 This mechanism
clearly empowers the court to prevent coupon settlements or any
other settlement where it finds that no meaningful relief is to be
awarded to individual class members. The problem, however, is
not that the current version of Rule 23 prevents courts from
avoiding transforming a class action into a bounty hunter action,
but that it does not require courts to prohibit such a transforma-
tion. Controlled only by the hopelessly vague directive to assure
that a settlement is "fair," class action courts have approved nu-
merous settlements that amount to virtually pure bounty hunter
" See Part III E.
.. See FRCP 23(e).
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actions in everything but name.' The task, then, is to insert lan-
guage into Rule 23 that will prevent such a result.
In approaching this task, there are two conceivable struc-
tural approaches to reform: insertion of categorical directives and
insertion of situation-specific directives. Categorical directives
are those that concededly sweep within their reach situations
that do not present the danger to be prevented, as well as those
that do. They do so because of the expected high transaction costs
involved in attempting to distinguish between the two situations,
and the serious risks that would flow from making an incorrect
assessment in a particular case. Situation-specific directives, in
contrast, provide a generalized directive that is designed to sepa-
rate the two types of situations on a case-by-case basis, and it is
expected that a court charged with implementation will apply
them correctly to specific fact situations. In order to prevent the
serious danger of bounty hunter actions within the rubric of class
actions, I recommend inclusion of both forms of restrictions, with
situation-specific limitations to be added at the outset of the case
and categorical limitations to be inserted at the settlement ap-
proval stage.
Initially, at the certification stage, the certifying court should
be directed to take into account as an important element of its
decision the reasonable likelihood that individual members of the
class will actually receive meaningful compensation as the result
of a successful verdict or a settlement. This inquiry would not, it
should be emphasized, focus on the likelihood of success on the
merits, but rather on the eventual feasibility of getting damage or
settlement awards transmitted to individual class members, as-
suming such success. Thus, where individual claims are small
and the award of payments to individual class members depends
on the filing of complex claim forms, a certifying court should be
reluctant to certify the class. Even if ultimately successful, such a
case is highly likely to turn out to be a bounty hunter action,
rather than the private compensatory action that the governing
substantive law has made it.'87
See Part II.
A 2000 RAND study on class action suits recommended that "judges require set-
tling parties to detail plans for disbursing benefits to eligible claimants and suggested
that preference be given to automatic disbursement schemes, such as crediting accounts of
eligible class members." Hensler and Rowe, 64 L & Contemp Probs at 150 (cited in note
61). While this proposal would no doubt represent an improvement, my recommendation
is to include the inquiry at the certification stage, rather than solely the settlement stage.
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Perhaps one could respond that insertion of such a textual
requirement is unnecessary, because certification of a 23(b)(3)
class already takes into account considerations of manageabil-
ity.18 But the ease of conducting a case is not necessarily the
same thing as certainty of payment to individual class members.
Indeed, it is likely that the ability to resolve a case through a
method that contemplates payment to relatively few class mem-
bers makes a case appear to be more manageable to many federal
judges. Without insertion of this express directive, there is little
reason to hope that a majority of federal judges would concern
themselves with this question in making a certification decision.
Because this directive asks a reviewing court to apply its general
standard to specific fact situations, this recommended reform
constitutes a situation-specific rule. In this sense, it would leave
room for judicial mistake and manipulation. But there would ap-
pear to exist no practical alternative, and express emphasis in
the Rule's text on the need to assure feasibility of individualized
awards to class members would undoubtedly go far toward restor-
ing the class action as the aggregative compensatory action it
must be, under the terms of the substantive laws that it purports
to enforce.
At the close of the action,'88 when the court is asked to review
the fairness of a proposed settlement, adoption of a more cate-
gorical approach is required, for the simple reason that such cate-
gorical rules appear to be readily available and can effectively
insure against the practices most likely to bring about the im-
proper transformation of a class action into a bounty hunter ac-
tion. Initially, an amendment to Rule 23 dictating that attorneys'
fees be measured by reference to the value of the total number of
class member claims actually filed, rather than the total amount
of settlement or potential claims, would go far toward deterring
pure bounty hunter class actions.'9 ° Moreover, use of coupon set-
Of course, in the context of settlement class actions, whose frequency is increasing, the
difference is moot.18 FRCP 23(b)(3) (listing as one of the factors pertinent to the court's findings as to
the maintainability of the action as a class action, "the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action").
189 Note that the dichotomy between the initial certification decision and subsequent
approval of settlement assumes the classic form of the class action. In light of the dra-
matic development in recent years of the so called settlement class action, in many cases
the two stages have been collapsed into one stage. However, the only impact of this change
on my suggested reforms would be that both would necessarily take place simultaneously.
9 Such a proposal was made in Professor Hensler's RAND study, which suggested
that "if judges approve coupon settlements ... they [should] base fee awards on the mone-
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tlements generally contributes to the improper transformation
into bounty hunter actions, since invariably such coupons will be
of little use to the vast majority of class members, even if they are
willing to overcome the strong inertia against filing claim forms
to obtain such coupons in the first place.'
Are there cases in which coupons, given as part of a settle-
ment, actually benefit class members up to the face value of the
coupons? Perhaps. But then the question arises whether it is fea-
sible, in the individual case, to distinguish coupons that (1) are
likely to be obtained by a substantial number, if not a majority, of
class members, and (2) are likely to provide a real economic value
to the class members that is roughly equivalent to the coupon's
face dollar value. The answer to this question requires thorough
empirical investigation that does not appear to have been con-
ducted. If, without the relevant empirical data, one does not feel
comfortable predicting that it will be possible for a court to make
this judgment accurately in an individual case and, on the basis
of anecdotal or casual information, one believes it far more likely
than not that the answer to both questions is "no," then the only
alternative is to adopt an express categorical rule prohibiting the
use of discount coupons in class action settlements.92
Such a proposal would no doubt be met by the response that
a blanket prohibition on coupon settlements would overwhelm
the courts with the burdensome adjudication of complex class ac-
tions that would otherwise have settled.' 93 But if the use of cou-
pon settlements renders the portrayal of the class action as a
tary value of coupons redeemed, not offered." Hensler and Rowe, 64 L & Contep Probs at
151 (cited in note 61) (emphasis in original).
,' See notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
192 Professor Leslie, who expresses substantial concern about the use of coupon settle-
ments, see note 116 and accompanying text, supra, rejects the idea of prohibiting all cou-
pon settlements. He argues that such a "proposal's simplicity is illusory in that it may be
difficult to determine what constitutes a coupon settlement. Some proposed coupon set-
tlements include a coupon component in a much larger settlement structure." Leslie, 49
UCLA L Rev at 1076 (cited in note 24) (internal citation omitted). But this argument ap-
pears to prove too much, at least if-as Professor Leslie appears to agree-there is a need
to do something to reduce the harms caused by coupon settlements. Whatever is done to
reduce those harms would require one to determine what is meant by "coupon settlement."
Indeed, making such determinations on the facts of an individual case is exactly the type
of activity that courts engage in regularly. Moreover, the fact that coupons make up only
part of a settlement does not seem to present any unique difficulties; a categorical rule
prohibiting use of coupon settlements would presumably prevent all uses of coupons as
part of a settlement.
" See id at 1076-77. Professor Leslie is afraid that judicial rejection of any settlement
with a coupon component will "deny concrete benefits to the class and force litigation in
which every member of the class could wind up with nothing." Id.
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compensatory device a sham, effectively transforming it into a
legislatively unauthorized qui tam-like bounty hunter action,
then practical concerns should not persuade us to continue the
lie. In any event, it is far more likely that considerably fewer
class actions would be brought, because of the enormous difficul-
ties in ultimately transmitting individual small-claim payments
to class members. If it is found that such a result undermines
effective enforcement of congressional regulation of corporate be-
havior, Congress has available to it the option of expressly estab-
lishing bounty hunter actions, in which uninjured plaintiffs are
rewarded for exposing unlawful corporate behavior. '94
It is arguable that a blanket prohibition on the use of dis-
count coupons in class action settlements goes too far.'95 Perhaps
it is possible to fashion less sweeping, more contingently framed
restrictions that would nevertheless go far toward preventing the
harms to which coupon use currently gives rise. For example,
Rule 23(e), directing the court to review proposed class settle-
ments for fairness, could be amended to create a strong presump-
tion against the use of coupon settlements. Under this approach,
a court in a particular case would have available a safety valve if
it determines that coupons would have real value to individual
class members. '96 However, because reviewing courts are gener-
ally concerned primarily with the goal of avoiding burdensome
litigation, the amended rule would need to provide that the only
way the presumption could be overcome would be on the basis of
a clear and convincing showing that individual class members are
,' It is not entirely clear whether such actions would satisfy the justiciability re-
quirements of Article III, which require injury in fact, traceability of that injury to defen-
dant's behavior, and the possibility of judicial action to remedy that injury. When the only
"injury" is the artificial one created by Congress for the very purpose of allowing a suit,
the essential elements of private rights adjudication are arguably undermined. While the
Supreme Court has upheld qui tam actions against Article III attack, Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v Stevens, 529 US 765, 774 (2000), it did so in large part on the histori-
cal pedigree of the practice, something that such bounty hunter actions would of course
lack. But if so, then the surreptitious creation of bounty hunter actions under the guise of
the aggregation of classic private compensatory claims becomes even more problematic
because they, of course, lack the historical pedigree that was so important to the Court in
upholding qui tam actions.
9 See Leslie, 49 UCLA at 1076 (cited in note 24) ("Some coupon settlements may be
appropriate. Even critics of coupon settlements recognize the legitimacy of coupon settle-
ments under certain conditions.") (internal citations omitted).
" Professor Leslie has suggested another possible reform, "requir[ing] that class
counsel be paid in the same currency as the class"-in other words, "the counsel shall
receive its fees in coupons as well." Id at 997. However, as a practical matter such an
approach is likely tantamount to the blanket prohibition of the use of discount coupons in
settlement.
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likely to benefit from the coupons. Any approval of the use of cou-
pons should, moreover, be contingent on the filing of claim forms
by a majority of class members. Class attorneys and defendants
would likely be deterred from entering into bounty hunter set-
tlements under these circumstances.
One potential difficulty with this situation-specific approach
is that it would leave reviewing courts with too broad a discretion
to continue their rubber stamp approval of proposed settlements
that are coupon-based. This would be a particularly serious con-
cern, in light of the fact that neither side to the settlement would
be presenting the court with counter evidence. Nevertheless, it is
clear that such an approach would bring about a situation no
worse, and probably significantly better, than the current opera-
tion of Rule 23.
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND LEGAL APATHY
In one sense, given the intense scholarly controversy over
and substantial judicial attention to questions about class actions
in recent years, the virtually total silence about the ways in
which the modern class action impacts the essential democratic
precepts of accountability and representation is surprising. In
another sense, however, such apathy in the legal world toward
the relevance of even foundational issues of democratic theory is
not all that unexpected. Numerous commentators, focused pri-
marily on their own normative policy goals, have been willing to
cast aside values of self-determination-at least where that proc-
ess is likely to produce conclusions that differ from their own
normative goals.'97 But engaging in legal analysis divorced from
its grounding in foundational precepts of American democracy-
even when those precepts may not be directly derived from the
Constitution-becomes theoretically incoherent at best and in-
vidiously manipulative at worst. And if there are any such pre-
cepts, they necessarily embody the value of popular sovereignty,
implemented and protected by the principles of representation
and accountability for sub-constitutional decisions of public pol-
icy.
198
"' See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135
U Pa L Rev 1479, 1497-98 (1987) (arguing that statutory interpretation need not conform
to the intent of Congress (and therefore, presumably the intent of the electorate) and
recommending a dynamic approach to meet changing societal circumstances).
" See Parts IV B and rV C.
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All too often, the modern 23(b)(3) class action has surrepti-
tiously transformed the governing substantive law, which unam-
biguously embodies a private compensatory remedial model as
the exclusive, primary, or secondary means of enforcing legisla-
tive restrictions on primary behavior, into an entirely distinct
"bounty hunter" remedial model-one that has not been enacted
as part of the substantive law. Pursuant to this approach, unin-
jured private individuals are rewarded for ferreting out and judi-
cially punishing corporate illegality, much in the manner that
classic qui tam actions historically have. 99 It has done so, even
though the class action exists solely as a procedural device de-
signed to facilitate implementation of existing substantive law.
Such a furtive transformation of governing law undermines the
principles of accountability and representation that are so essen-
tial to any political system that views popular sovereignty as an
important element.
The class action achieves this result through the initiation
process of opt-out and the resolution process of settlements in
which no meaningful compensation is received by an overwhelm-
ing portion of the class. When combined, these two elements ren-
der the class little more than a figment of the class lawyers'
imaginations, leaving those attorneys as the only real parties in
interest and virtually the only private individuals who stand to
benefit financially from successful prosecution of the action. This
situation arises even though those attorneys need not be (and
generally are not) themselves injured victims.
While it is at best uncertain that a persuasive constitutional
or statutory challenge could be mounted against current prac-
tice, °00 it is both appropriate and necessary for the Advisory Com-
mittee to reform modern class action practice, if only on norma-
tive grounds of social policy and political theory. The proposals
for reform that I have suggested, ' for the most part, do not rep-
resent dramatically new suggestions. For example, the argument
that opt-out should be replaced by opt-in has been made at least
since the time I was a law student. The contribution I hope to
have made in this Article, however, is the development of an en-
tirely different theoretical perspective on the modern class action
and the provision of an entirely new set of justifications,
See text accompanying note 79.
2'O Part III E.
See Part IV.
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grounded in fundamental notions of democratic theory, for those
proposed revisions.
Perhaps it is proper to include within my goals in writing
this Article the desire to shift the focus of at least a portion of the
scholarly debate on the class action issue. All too often, scholars
have approached the class action issue as if it were a self-
contained device to control illegal corporate behavior."2 To be
sure, several respected scholars have sought to shape the class
action inquiry by reference to principles of economic analysis.2 3
But none seems to have recognized that the class action operates
within a broader political framework, and that how the device
interacts with the substantive law it purports to enforce can have
dramatic consequences for the viability of the American democ-
ratic system. Other commentators may well disagree with my
assessment of those consequences, but any scholarly considera-
tion of the issue would represent a significant improvement, and
provide hope for the future of American democracy.
See Part III F 1.
See, for example, Coffee, 54 U Chi L Rev 877 (cited in note 99) (exploring the causes
of the failure of the market for legal services in the class action context); Macey and
Miller, 53 U Chi L Rev 1 (cited in note 97) (arguing against providing notice in small
claims class actions).

